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INTRODUCTION
Despite a perhaps instinctual feeling to the contrary, the goals of
labor and immigration statutes and policies are not inherently in
conflict.1 Congress sought to create industrial peace and encourage
the free flow of commerce with the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) by (1) safeguarding the exercise of fundamental rights and
free choice for employees;2 (2) restoring the status quo ex ante to
the violation; and (3) deterring violations of the law through reme-
dies such as backpay,3 reinstatement,4 cease-and-desist orders,5 or
orders to collectively bargain.6 The Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act (IRCA) regulates who may enter the United States, sets
limits on their ability to work, and deters employers from violating
the law with financial and other penalties.7 Nothing in one is in-
tended to limit the other.8 But the Supreme Court put the
effectiveness of the two statutes into conflict with its decision in
Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or “Board”), holding that the primary NLRA remedies of
backpay and reinstatement are generally unavailable in cases of vio-
lations against unauthorized discriminatees who were never lawfully
1. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892–93 (1984) (“Counterintuitive though
it may be, we do not find any conflict between application of the [National Labor Relations
Act] to undocumented aliens and the mandate of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”).
2. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012).
3. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012); see Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 376,
380 (2011) (Chairman Liebman and Member Pearce, concurring), aff’d in part, remanded in
part sub nom. Palma v. NLRB, 723 F.3d 176, 187 (2d Cir. 2013).
4. E.g., § 160(c).
5. E.g., United States Postal Serv., 345 N.L.R.B. 409 (2005); Hickmott Foods, Inc., 242
N.L.R.B. 1357, 1357 (1979).
6. E.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Transmarine Navigation
Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 389 (1968).
7. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. ); e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1181, 1221, 1321
(2012).
8. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5662.
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intended to be employed at all.9 Instead of incentivizing compli-
ance, current interpretations may incentivize an employer to make
a business calculation and decide that a violation might be the cost
of doing business in light of the potential competitive advantage
the company would gain.10 The Hoffman decision therefore pits the
need to deter an unauthorized worker from securing employment
against the need to protect the right of employees to engage in
protected concerted action with respect to the terms and condi-
tions of their employment—and then requires the NLRA remedies
to yield.11 Moreover, the Court’s narrow view of the harm caused by
an unfair labor practice and subordination of labor law to immigra-
tion law has resulted in unanticipated consequences for all
employees.12
Much of the existing analyses of the contradictions and tensions
between the NLRA and the IRCA, as well the Hoffman ruling, have
focused on unauthorized workers. This Article takes no position on
whether attempts to secure additional rights or remedies for unau-
thorized workers are desirable, either as a social or political matter.
Instead, it focuses on a harm that has gone relatively unarticulated:
the negative effect of incentives for non-compliance on authorized
employees who work alongside unauthorized workers and the ero-
sion of the mental confidence of those authorized employees in
their free exercise of their fundamental labor rights. These addi-
tional adverse and unintended consequences fall on authorized
9. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB , 535 U.S. 137, 149-153 (2002).
10. See, e.g., Robert I. Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. Produce Disposable
Workers?, 14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 103, 141 (2003); Charles J. Morris, A Blueprint For Reform of
the National Labor Relations Act, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 517, 528 (1994) (noting “unfair labor
practices that were not deterred, either because of the Board’s failure to enforce vigorously
the core provisions of the Act, or because the Act does not contain effective enforcement
mechanisms” and observing that the Board has a “demonstrated inability” to protect employ-
ees “with timely and adequate remedies”); Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies For Employment
Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 477–78 (1992); Paul Weiler,
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights To Self-Organization Under The NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1769, 1791 (1983).
11. Correales, supra note 10 at 147.
12. See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147–52 (2002)
(requiring Board’s remedy to “yield” to immigration policy and limiting Board’s remedial
authority by denying ability to award backpay, a standard Board remedy, to discriminatees
whose employer violated the NLRA when discriminatees were unauthorized workers); Sure-
Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903–05 (1984) (holding that the NLRB’s normally broad
discretion in awarding remedial relief is constrained by federal immigration policies, despite
the fact that discriminatees suffered harm and employer violated the NLRA); Christopher
David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic Compounds, the New Bracero Pro-
gram, and the Supreme Court’s Role in Making Federal Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6 (2003)
(“[T]he Court has set up an apparent conflict between the NLRA and some other federal
legislative scheme, then resolved that conflict by effectively abrogating federal labor policy in
favor of federal ‘other’ policy.”).
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employees due to the collective focus of the NLRA, its goals, and its
inherent operation. In particular, authorized employees may be
more reluctant to exercise their protected rights and lose faith in
the Board’s willingness to safeguard their rights after seeing their
employer violate the NLRA and stifle protected activity with few sig-
nificant consequences.13 Because the Board relies on unions or
individuals to report employers’ alleged unfair labor practices, this
chilling effect on the authorized employees severely limits its ability
to enforce the law.14
Part I of this Article provides a background for both the NLRA
and the IRCA. It examines the goals and remedies of both statutes
as well as the impact of the Supreme Court’s Hoffman decision on
available remedies.
Part II addresses the currently-skewed remedial incentives. It con-
siders why employers are tempted to hire unauthorized workers
and commit unfair labor practices that are then inadequately reme-
died, which creates a situation that adversely effects the rights of
authorized employees.
Part III more closely analyzes this consequential harm. This Part
identifies the erosions on the NLRA’s collective nature and the im-
pact on authorized employees’ terms and conditions of
employment as well as their ability to change them. It also examines
the far-reaching erosion of mental confidence experienced by au-
thorized employees when considering their statutorily protected
rights. This chilling effect, when unaddressed, represents a failure
of the NLRA to achieve its remedial goal to restore the status quo
ex ante to the employer’s unfair labor practice.
In Part IV, this Article considers the literature addressing reme-
dies in cases involving unauthorized workers, including the many
existing suggestions for refinements that might bring balance to the
currently misaligned incentive structure. It observes, however, that
these proposals reflect a current focus on unauthorized workers
that not only poses practical and political dilemmas if implemented
but, as a normative measure, continues to overlook the problem of
13. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 (1969) (noting that “[i]f an employer
has succeeded in undermining a union’s strength and destroying the laboratory conditions
necessary for a fair election, he may see no need to violate a cease-and-desist order by further
unlawful activity. The damage will have been done . . . .”). The same might be said for ex-
treme violations of the law in other non-election cases when one severe act is enough to send
ripples though the workforce and chill protected activity.
14. The same holds true for alleged violations by unions; there must be a charge from
an employer. See Investigate Charges, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-
charges (last visited Nov. 30, 2017). Unlike some other agencies, the Board cannot indepen-
dently decide to investigate an employer’s compliance with the law. See id.
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the harm done to authorized employees—and may even cause
them further harm.
Given that any attempt to amend the NLRA or modify Hoffman to
account for this developing problem is almost certainly doomed to
fail in the foreseeable future, Part V concludes that it may be more
expedient to work within the existing statutory text and case law to
address the distinct harm to authorized worker as a part of the res-
toration of the status quo. It therefore suggests that in cases where
an unfair labor practice has been found involving an unauthorized
worker, the General Counsel and the Board should routinely con-
sider expanded appropriate remedies. These remedies could
potentially include longer notice posting times, notice mailing with
explanatory material educating the remaining workers of their
rights, publication of the notice for a period of weeks in a publica-
tion of general circulation, visitation to ensure compliance with the
Board’s order, and other measures designed to restore the confi-
dence and willingness to act of employees, particularly the
authorized workers who have been harmed by their employer’s
actions.
I. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE NLRA, IRCA, AND KEY
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The NLRA interacts with immigration law not only through its
coverage but also through its remedies and policies. After outlining
the foundations of the NLRA and the IRCA, this section discusses
the key Supreme Court decision bearing on the deterrence—or in-
centivizing—of unlawful conduct involving unauthorized
employees and the Board’s responses. This body of law currently
leads to remedies that cannot restore authorized workers to the sta-
tus quo ex ante to an employer’s unlawful conduct.
A. The NLRA: Goals and Remedies
The NLRA governs the right of employees to engage in con-
certed activity in the workplace, whether unionized or not.15
Although several classes of workers are excluded from coverage, un-
authorized workers are not among them—the Supreme Court has
affirmed that they are statutory “employees.”16 The first section will
15. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152, 157–60, 163–67, 169 (2012).
16. § 152(3); Amay’s Bakery and Noodle Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214, 214 (1976) (“The Board
consistently has held that illegal aliens are employees within the meaning of the Act and are
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discuss the goals that the NLRA seeks to accomplish. The second
section will discuss the main categories of remedies and their objec-
tives under the NLRA.
1. Goals of the NLRA
Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935 to remove barriers to the
free flow of commerce by fostering industrial peace and to mitigate
the inequality of power between employees and employers, which
inherently tended to reduce wage rates and hinder the economy.17
Against the backdrop of the Great Depression, when strikes and
other work disruptions seemed too common, Congress determined
that encouraging collective bargaining and protecting workers’
rights to association, organization, and representation in employ-
ment negotiations would promote commerce and labor stability.18
The focus of the Act lies in the “concerted” nature of the behavior:
working for some form of “mutual aid and protection” in the work-
place.19 Justice Thurgood Marshall put it clearly: “[t]hese are, for
the most part, collective rights, rights to act in concert with one’s
fellow employees; they are protected not for their own sake but as
an instrument of the national labor policy of minimizing industrial
strife by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining.”20
With this in mind, the NLRA sets rules and limitations on the
conduct of labor unions and employers while also protecting the
entitled to the protection of the Act. Aliens without working papers have been permitted to
vote and have been accorded protection in the exercise of Section 7 rights.”). As the Su-
preme Court affirmed in Sure-Tan, “[t]he Board has consistently held that undocumented
aliens are ‘employees’ within the meaning of § 2(3) of the Act. . . . Since undocumented
aliens are not among the few groups of workers expressly exempted by Congress, they plainly
come within the broad statutory definition of ‘employee.’” Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 891–92
(internal citations omitted) (footnote omitted). In considering the definition of the term
“employee” under the NLRA and in light of the IRCA, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
found that the legislative history and plain language of the IRCA was not intended to—and
did not—change the definition under labor law. Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that authorized and unauthorized employees could be in the same
collective bargaining unit, and noting that Congress did not amend the NLRA after the Su-
preme Court’s Sure-Tan decision upheld the inclusion of unauthorized workers in the
definition of employee).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
18. Id.
19. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–67 (1978) (NLRA’s protection of em-
ployee activities based on Sec. 7 of the Act protecting concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection); NLRB v. White Oak Manor, 452 F. App’x 374, 379–80 (4th Cir. 2011) (discuss-
ing the scope of concerted activity for mutual aid and protection as it relates to the kind of
conduct protected under the NLRA).
20. Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Comm. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975).
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fundamental rights of employees “to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all such activities. . . .”21 Employers violate the NLRA if
they interfere with employees who exercise their statutory rights;22
assist or interfere with a labor union;23 discriminate against an em-
ployee for union activity by (for example) firing, retaliating, or
otherwise punishing him;24 punish an employee for filing a charge
under the NLRA;25 or refuse to bargain with a union when required
to do so.26 Other parts of the law govern picketing, boycotts, and
strikes.27
2. Remedies Under the NLRA
The Board is authorized to prevent any person from breaking
the NLRA.28 In addition to express remedies such as backpay and
21. 29 U.S.C. § 157. It has been noted that employees’ rights under the NLRA are
largely procedural:
The NLRA does not guarantee any substantive rights to workers; in the main, it con-
tains only procedures governing organization and collective bargaining. If workers are
able to organize, the Act provides them only with the opportunity to negotiate an
agreement with their employers. Employers, in turn, are obliged to negotiate in good
faith with their employees’ designated representative. Good faith bargaining does not
require that an agreement be reached or even that a concession be made.
James A. Gross, The Human Rights Movement at U.S. Workplaces: Challenges and Changes, 65
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 12 (2012). Although this is to some extent true, when crafting the
NLRA, Congress sought to “equalize the bargaining power of the employee with that of his
employer by allowing employees to band together” and act in a concerted manner. NLRB v.
City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984). Workers may share information about the
terms of their employment, plan how to approach an employer, and elect representatives to
advocate for their positions, each of which can considerably improve their working condi-
tions. A collective identity develops out of the procedures Gross identifies, an identity that
can prompt a long-term relationship between employers and employees through the bargain-
ing process (a primary goal of the NLRA) while also fostering a sense of common cause and
goals among employees.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1).
23. § 158 (a)(2).
24. § 158 (a)(3).
25. § 158 (a)(4).
26. § 158 (b)(4); (b)(7).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 158.
28. § 160(a).
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reinstatement,29 the NLRA gives extremely broad remedial powers
to the Board in order to “effectuate the policies of this Act.”30
Remedies under the NLRA fall into three main categories. First,
some remedies try to restore the status quo ex ante to the statutory
violation.31 These include backpay and reinstatement to financially
return the employee to where he or she would have been before
the employer’s unlawful firing or retaliation.32 Restoring the status
quo also includes restoring a union’s right to communicate with the
employees.33 Possibilities here include requiring the employer to
give a union access to the facility to talk with employees onsite, to
provide bulletin boards for union pamphlets and notices, or to pro-
vide a list of employees’ contact information so the union can
communicate its message offsite (and away from the employer’s
oversight).34 These orders let employees hear more about a union
and be “reassure[ed] that they can learn about the benefits of
union representation, and can enlist the aid of union representa-
tives, if they desire to do so, without fear of being subjected to
severe unfair labor practices.”35 Particularly during union organiz-
ing, remedies giving the union access to employees mitigate the
damage caused by the employer’s violation of the law.36 In cases of
extreme violations during the critical period of an election that
29. § 160(c).
30. Id. (emphasis added). Section 160(c) states: “If upon the preponderance of the testi-
mony taken the [Labor] Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the
complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board
shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order
requiring such person to cease-and-desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without backpay, as will ef-
fectuate the policies of this Act.” Id.
31. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941); NLRB v. Beverly
Health & Rehab. Servs., 187 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming Board order to restore
the status quo between the parties before the unfair labor practices began and prevent the
employer from benefiting from its wrongdoing); Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d
1115, 1118 (7th Cir. 1992).
32. See NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 263 (1969) (discussing
backpay); Phelps Dodge Corp., 313 U.S. at 195 (discussing reinstatement);.
33. See generally Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
34. E.g., Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1241–42 (1966).
35. Charlotte Amphitheater Corp., 331 N.L.R.B. 1274, 1276 (2000) (quoting United
States Serv. Indus., Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 231, 232 (1995)).
36. United States Serv. Indus., Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. at 232. Union access violations depend on
many factors, including the accessibility of employees via channels outside of the workplace,
how the employer has applied its non-solicitation/non-distribution rules against union com-
munications, the employer’s property rights, whether access is during working time and/or
in work areas, and the right of employees to hear the union’s message as part of organizing.
Remedies are restorative, but also very fact-specific. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. 527
(1992); Albertson’s Inc. v. NLRB, 301 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2002).
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threaten conditions for employees’ free choice, the Board may or-
der a re-run election.37
A second category of remedy is intended to send a message to
employees that the employer understands that it violated the NLRA
and will not do so again. In so doing, it educates employees about
their statutory rights and reinforces to them that their employer
cannot violate their rights with impunity.38 Employers are usually
ordered to post a notice issued by the Board in the workplace that
lists each element of the company’s violations (including those
against individuals) and pledges that “we will not . . .” break the law
in that way again.39 This notice must also be sent by email or posted
on the company’s internal website if it usually posts information or
communicates with employees that way.40 In egregious circum-
stances, a high-ranking member of management may be required
to stand before the employees and read the notice to employees (or
be present while a Board official does so).41 Such notice readings
are designed to ensure that “employees will fully perceive that [the
employer] and its managers are bound by the requirements” of the
NLRA.42 At times, the Board will order the notice to be mailed to all
37. Gen. Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948); see also IRIS U.S.A., Inc., 336 N.L.R.B.
1013, 1013–14 (2001).
38. See, e.g., HTH Corp., 361 N.L.R.B. 709, 714 (2014).
39. The introductory “we will not” phrasing is part of the Board’s standard notice post-
ing language, and as such it appears in virtually every case followed by a specific description
of the nature of the violation found. See, e.g., United States Serv. Indus., Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. at
233.
40. See generally J & R Flooring, Inc., 356 N.L.R.B. 11 (2010). Notice posting is consid-
ered an “essential element of the Board’s remedies for unfair labor practices since the
earliest cases under the Act” insofar as it “help[s] to counteract the effect of unfair labor
practices on employees by informing them of their rights under the Act and the Board’s role
in protecting the free exercise of those rights. They inform employees of steps to be taken by
the respondent to remedy its violations of the Act and provide assurances that future viola-
tions will not occur.” Id. at 12.
41. E.g., Print Fulfillment Serv. LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. 1243, 1247–49 (2014) (granting no-
tice reading remedy and noting importance of showing even sophisticated employees that
their employer understands its obligations under the Act, especially when highest levels of
management developed plans to thwart employees’ unionization efforts); Farm Fresh Co.,
361 N.L.R.B. 848, 848–849 n.3 (2014); HTH Corp., 361 N.L.R.B. 709, 715–716 (2014).
42. Homer D. Bronson Co., 349 N.L.R.B. 512, 515 (2007) (“The public reading of the
notice is an effective but moderate way to let in a warning wind of information and, more
important, reassurance. . . . [T]he presence of a responsible management official when a
government official informs employees of the terms of the remedial order is not demeaning,
but only a minimal acknowledgment of the obligations that have been imposed by law. The
employees in this case are entitled to at least that much assurance that their organizational
rights will be respected in the future.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Federated Logis-
tics & Operations v. NLRB, 400 F.3d 920, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing and upholding the
Board’s order for a notice-reading at Federated Logistics & Operations, 340 N.L.R.B. 255,
257, 15 (2003)); J & R Flooring, Inc., 356 N.L.R.B. at 12.
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employees and former employees impacted by the employer’s mis-
conduct when many would otherwise not hear of the violation or
when it is preferable to allow employees to review the notice pri-
vately without the risk of employer surveillance.43 Another remedy
within this category is the “publication” remedy. This is used in situ-
ations “where the violations are flagrant and repeated” and
publication of the notice along with any supporting documents in
publications of general circulation and local interest will have “the
salutary effect of neutralizing the frustrating effects of persistent il-
legal activity by letting in ‘a warming wind of information and,
more important, reassurance.’”44
The third type of remedy covers additional orders for particularly
egregious violations of the NLRA, or, in factual contexts, where the
standard remedies are for some reason insufficient or inappropri-
ate. For example, broad cease-and-desist orders are used “when a
respondent is shown to have a proclivity to violate the Act or has
engaged in such egregious or widespread misconduct as to demon-
strate a general disregard for the employees’ fundamental statutory
rights.”45 Employers that unlawfully failed to bargain with a union
may be specifically ordered to do so.46 On a case-by-case basis, the
43. See, e.g., Farm Fresh Co., 361 N.L.R.B. at 848–49, n.3; Bud Antle, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B.
1257, 1257–58 (2013) (notice mailing appropriate because employees were mobile when
harvesting crops; notice was also read to employees at each location at start of harvest), abro-
gated by Bud Antle, Inc., 2014 WL 2929802 511 (June 27, 2014). However, there must be a
specific justification for the notice mailing. See, e.g., S.E. Clemons, Inc., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 94,
2016 WL 146996, at *5 n.1 (Jan. 12, 2016); On Target Security, Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 31,
2015 WL 1228316, at *3 (Mar. 17, 2015).
44. NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1039 (1977); see also HTH Corp., 361 N.L.R.B. 709, 715 (2014) (publication of no-
tice in two local publications twice a week for eight weeks).
45. Hickmott Foods, 242 N.L.R.B. 1357, 1357 (1979); e.g., NLRB v. Blake Constr. Co.,
663 F.2d 272, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1981); KenMor Elec. Co., 355 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1035 (2010) (up-
holding a broad cease-and-desist order when multiple employers were involved in a
discriminatory hiring plan); Beverly Health & Rehab. Serv., Inc., 346 N.L.R.B.1319, 1355
(2006) (upholding a broad corporate cease-and-desist order when corporate officials played
a prominent part in the unfair labor practices); United States Postal Serv., 345 N.L.R.B. 409,
409–10 (2005); Grinnell Fire Prot. Sys., Co., 335 N.L.R.B.473, 473 (2001).
46. An order to bargain is known as a Gissel order, named for the Supreme Court deci-
sion that announced the remedy. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). Gissel
orders are intended to address situations where the employer’s conduct has been so outra-
geous and pervasive that other remedies are unlikely to undo the effects of the violation on
employee free choice in a fair election. Abramson, LLC, 345 N.L.R.B. 171, 176 (2005). Gissel
orders may also be used for a small subset of somewhat less egregious cases where the possi-
bility of using other remedies to erase the effect of past practices exists, but is so slight that
employees would be better protected by a bargaining order. Id. In some cases, the employer
may also be ordered to pay backpay, often to bring the union back to the level of bargaining
strength it would have had absent the labor violation. Melody San Bruno Inc., 325 N.L.R.B.
846, 846 (1998); Transmarine Navigation Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 389, 390 (1968). Bargaining
schedules and written progress reports may also be required. Gimrock Constr., Inc., 356
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Board may grant visitation rights to Board agents to monitor an
employer’s specific compliance with terms of an order “when the
equities demonstrate a likelihood that a respondent will fail to co-
operate or otherwise attempt to evade compliance.”47 For example,
in HTH Corp. (“Pacific Beach Hotel”), the Board found it appropriate
to order a narrowly tailored three-year visitation clause requiring
the employer to allow an appointed Board agent to enter its facility
at reasonable times and in a manner not unduly disruptive of its
operations to determine compliance with the Board’s three-year
notice posting, distribution, and mailing requirements.48
Courts have traditionally excluded punitive damages from possi-
ble remedies under the NLRA,49 even though the prohibition
arguably prevents the Board from “effectuating the policies” of the
NLRA in certain cases. Approximately three years after the passage
of the Act, the Supreme Court’s decision in Consolidated Edison Co.
v. NLRB announced that the NLRA authorizes the Board to issue a
cease-and-desist order and take other affirmative action, but that
“the power to command affirmative action is remedial, not puni-
tive.”50 The Court’s 1944 Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB decision
reinforced the point. Though the Court held that the Board could
award backpay (because that remedy was related directly to address-
ing the employees’ grievances),51 it clarified that the NLRA did not
“confer a punitive jurisdiction enabling the Board to inflict upon
the employer any penalty it may choose because he is engaged in
unfair labor practices even though the Board may be of the opinion
that the policies of the Act may be effectuated by such an order.”52
B. The IRCA: Goals and Remedies
The IRCA,53 while not directly a part of traditional labor law, nev-
ertheless contains provisions that directly impact those laws and
remedies, including the NLRA. One of the most direct points of
intersection is the treatment of unauthorized workers and the hir-
ing obligations of employers. The first section will discuss the goals
N.L.R.B. 529, 529 (2011) (when employer failed over a period of years to comply with Board
bargaining order).
47. Cherokee Marine Terminal, 287 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1083 (1988).
48. HTH Corp., 361 NLRB 709, 717–18 (2014).
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012).
50. 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938).
51. 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
52. Id. at 11–12.
53. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. ).
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of the IRCA. The second section will outline the basic remedies
under the statute as they relate to common violations.
1. Goals of IRCA
Congress enacted the IRCA in 1986 as an amendment to the Im-
migration and Nationality Act. Recognizing work as an attractive
magnet for aliens,54 the IRCA makes it “unlawful for a person or
other entity to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment
in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized
alien . . . with respect to such employment.”55 Employers therefore
must meet specific verification requirements to confirm that a new
employee is authorized to work in the United States.56 An employer
is also prohibited from hiring or continuing to employ a worker
who it knows is unauthorized.57 On the workers’ side, it is a crime to
use a false identification document or falsely claim authorization to
work in the United States58 or to use someone else’s identification
document.59
In addition to preventing illegal immigration, one of the driving
policies behind the IRCA was to change the financial incentives to
hire unauthorized workers via successively greater fines on employ-
ers.60 At the same time, unauthorized aliens themselves would be
deterred from entering the country to seek employment since jobs
would be harder to find, and work would be preserved for those
legally permitted to perform it.61 Congress also recognized the risk
of IRCA’s unintended consequences, such as disincentive for em-
ployers to hire lawful workers who look or sound “foreign.”62 It is
54. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650
(“Employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally . . . . Employers will be deterred
by the penalties in this legislation from hiring unauthorized aliens and this, in turn, will deter
aliens from entering illegally or violating their status in search of employment.”).
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2012).
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2012).
57. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(3)–(4) (2012). As Professor Kati Griffith noted, however, “the
IRCA specifically did not make it unlawful for an undocumented worker who did not use
fraudulent documents to work or accept employment.” Kati L. Griffith, A Supreme Stretch: The
Supremacy Clause in the Wake of IRCA and Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
127, 129 (2008).
60. See Robert F. Koets, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of § 274A of
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a), Involving Unlawful Employment of Aliens,
130 A.L.R. Fed. 381, § 3 (1996) (citing cases).
61. See United States v. Van, 931 F.2d 384, 386 (6th Cir. 1991); Koets, supra note 60, § 7.
62. H.R. REP. NO. 99-1000 (Conf. Rep.), at 87–88 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5840, 5842; see also United States v. Todd Corp., 900 F.2d 164, 165 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Congress
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therefore unlawful to discriminate against an authorized individual
with respect to hiring or employment on the basis of national ori-
gin.63 The IRCA itself is silent with respect to backpay awards under
the NLRA.64
2. Remedies Under the IRCA
Unlike the NLRA, the IRCA imposes both civil and criminal pen-
alties.65 On the criminal side, an employer engaging in a pattern or
practice of violations “shall be fined not more than $3,000 for each
unauthorized alien, imprisoned for not more than six months for
the entire pattern or practice, or both, notwithstanding the provi-
sions of any other Federal law relating to fine levels.”66 Civil
penalties run on a tier system based on the frequency of the of-
fense, and the ranges are wide.67 For example, an initial fine for an
offense after March 27, 2008 runs from $375 to $3,200; a second
from $3,200 to $6,500; and more than two from $4,300 to $16,000.68
Cease-and-desist orders carry their own civil penalties, also on a pro-
gressive system.69 Other “remedial action as is appropriate” may be
ordered.70 Employers must also maintain records for inspection
proving their employees’ eligibility to work.71 They are, however,
entitled to a good-faith affirmative defense if they establish compli-
ance with various statutory methods verifying eligibility for
employment.72
was particularly concerned about documented aliens and ‘foreign looking and sounding’
United States citizens.”) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-1000).
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (2012). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 echoes this
provision more generally for all employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012).
64. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149 (2002) (accepting
the Board’s point that the IRCA is silent with respect to backpay, but dismissing the argu-
ment when reaching the result); see also Griffith, supra note 59 at 129 (also noting that “[t]he
IRCA’s express preemption provision dealt only with its preemptive effect on state laws sanc-
tioning employers for hiring undocumented immigrant workers.”).
65. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(a), (e)(4), (f) (2012); 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.10(a), (b)(1)(ii)
(2017).
66. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(a).
67. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b) (2017).
68. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(1)(ii).
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4).
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(B)(ii).
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(3) (2012).
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3), (b) (2012).
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C. The Supreme Court, the Board, and Unauthorized Workers
Because the bulk of the literature and legal precedent regarding
remedies in cases involving unauthorized workers focuses on reme-
dies for those employees rather than their authorized coworkers,
one is well-served to examine them as the sources of the current
unsatisfying state of the law. In Hoffman, the Supreme Court held
that no backpay could be awarded to a discriminatee under the
NLRA because such an award exceeded the Board’s remedial au-
thority.73 In so doing, it also subordinated the NLRA to
immigration laws by finding that a backpay award would violate the
IRCA’s policies and maintaining that the Board could not involve
itself in immigration laws by issuing that kind of remedy.74 The ma-
jority emphasized that “it is impossible for an undocumented alien
to obtain employment in the United States without some party di-
rectly contravening explicit congressional policies.”75 Allowing
backpay, it concluded, would encourage future violations of immi-
gration law by incentivizing unauthorized workers to seek
employment and file claims under the NLRA to keep ill-gotten
pay.76 Nor could the required mitigation of losses be made without
the worker further breaking the law by obtaining other employ-
ment.77 The Hoffman majority saw the employee’s unauthorized
immigration and work as the key act that brought the labor and
immigration statutes into a conflict they might not otherwise have.78
As a result, the justices cited other remedies under the NLRA, such
as notice readings and broad cease-and-desist orders, as sufficient to
remedy violations.79
In contrast, Justice Breyer’s dissent saw the issue as primarily a
labor problem and fought against forcing labor to take a back seat to
73. Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151–52 (2002).
74. Id. at 148–49.
75. Id. at 148. The Court therefore seems to have rejected the earlier Sure-Tan logic that
some form of backpay and/or reinstatement could be awarded upon lawful reentry.
76. Id. at 150–51. Professor Senn offers an interesting perspective on Hoffman, noting
that the employee at issue had himself violated the IRCA by engaging in fraudulent conduct
in obtaining his employment. Craig Robert Senn, Proposing A Uniform Remedial Approach for
Undocumented Workers Under Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 113,
160 (2008). Senn argues that the Hoffman court was at least implicitly guided by this fact in its
conclusion that awarding backpay would expressly thwart the purpose of the IRCA—a law
that expressly imposes criminal fines on an unauthorized worker who tries to gain employ-
ment using fraudulent documents. See id. at 159–61.
77. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150–51.
78. Nhan T. Vu & Jeff Schwartz, Workplace Rights and Illegal Immigration: How Implied Re-
peal Analysis Cuts Through the Haze of Hoffman Plastic, its Predecessors and its Progeny, 29 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 33 (2008).
79. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 152.
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immigration laws.80 Arguing that the Board must remedy labor vio-
lations and that it has broad discretion to do so, he maintained that
backpay serves a critical remedial purpose beyond compensating
victims, including “deterrence, i.e., discouraging employers from vi-
olating the Nation’s labor laws.”81 Without the possibility of strong
remedial action, “employers could conclude that they can violate
the labor laws at least once with impunity.”82 According to Justice
Breyer, nothing in the immigration laws barred enforcing the
NLRA with all of its remedies.83
Shortly after the Hoffman decision, the Board’s Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel issued a memorandum reiterating that, because
Hoffman dealt only with remedies, “an individual’s work authoriza-
tion status is irrelevant to a respondent’s liability under the Act . . .
questions concerning that status should be left for the compliance
stage of the case.”84 Critically, for the purposes of collective action
and representation of both authorized and unauthorized workers
alike, a particular employee’s immigration status still remains irrele-
vant to identifying an appropriate collective bargaining unit.85
The Second Circuit extended Hoffman in 2013, ruling that all un-
authorized immigrants are barred from a backpay remedy
regardless of whether they engaged in fraud or misrepresentation
in procuring employment.86 In so doing, it focused on the fact that
an unlawful employment relationship was in place, regardless of
whether it was the employer or the employee who violated the
IRCA. Notably, the Circuit concluded that backpay would be con-
trary to Congress’s intended immigration policy given that the
employee was never legally entitled to work and awarding backpay
would incentivize violations of the IRCA.87 It thus prioritized the
enforcement against unauthorized employee’s violation of IRCA
over the employer’s violation of the NLRA and IRCA (if it know-
ingly employed an unauthorized worker).88 Receiving the case
again on a remand from the Circuit, the Board ordered conditional
reinstatement subject to the unauthorized employees presenting
80. Id. at 153–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 153–54.
82. Id. at 154.
83. Id. at 153, 155–56.
84. Memorandum from Arthur Rosenfeld, Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to All Reg’l Dirs., Of-
ficers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Memorandum GC 02-06, 1 (July 19, 2002), https://
apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45800e2379.
85. Id. at B.3.
86. Palma v. NLRB, 723 F.3d 176, 185 (2d Cir. 2013).
87. Id. at 184–87.
88. For a discussion of “comparable culpability” and relative fault, see Kathleen Kim,
Beyond Coercion, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1558, 1579–82 (2015).
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the employer with documentation showing that they were now au-
thorized to work in the United States. This remedy reflects the
reality that the employer hired the workers in violation of IRCA and
discharged them in violation of the NLRA.89
II. SKEWED EMPLOYER INCENTIVES
The history of the NLRA shows the importance of maintaining
industrial peace and ensuring that all workers are free to exercise
their fundamental rights in the workplace.90 At the same time, the
legislative history of the IRCA shows it was intended to comple-
ment, not run counter to, federal labor and employment laws—
including the NLRA.91 House committee reports emphasize that,
although it sought to prevent the employment of unauthorized
workers, the IRCA would not limit the power of the Board to rem-
edy violations against undocumented employees92 because doing so
would be counter-productive to congressional intent.93 Indeed, the
reports reflect an overall belief that immigration and labor law
89. Mezonos Maven Bakery Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 2015 WL 1439921, at *3–4 (Mar.
27, 2015). In requiring the unauthorized employees to present documentation of their new
authorized work status within a reasonable time, the Board recognized that “[b]ecause Hoff-
man limits the Board’s authority to order backpay, conditional reinstatement is the only
means available to the Board to provide relief to the discriminatees and the principal means
of deterring future unfair labor practices.” Id.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
91. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5662.
92. Id. (“It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions provisions
of the bill be used to undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in existing law, or
to limit the powers of federal or state labor relations boards, labor standards agencies, or
labor arbitrators to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented employees for
exercising their rights before such agencies or for engaging in activities protected by existing
law. In particular, the employer sanctions provisions are not intended to limit in any way the
scope of the term ‘employee’ in Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as
amended, or of the rights and protections stated in Sections 7 and 8 of that Act. As the
Supreme Court observed in Sure-Tan[,] Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984)[,] application of
the NLRA ‘helps to assure that the wages and employment conditions of lawful residents are
not adversely affected by the competition of illegal alien employees who are not subject to
the standard terms of employment.’ 467 U.S. at 893.”).
93. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8–9 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757,
5758 (making the same point, and going even further: no provision of the IRCA should be
read to “limit the powers of State or Federal labor standards agencies such as the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration, the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of
Labor, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the National Labor Relations
Board, or Labor arbitrators, in conformity with existing law, to remedy unfair practices com-
mitted against undocumented employees for exercising their rights before such agencies or
for engaging in activities protected by these agencies. To do otherwise would be counter-
productive of our intent to limit the hiring of undocumented employees and the depressing
effect on working conditions caused by their employment”).
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could work together to create a disincentive for employer violations
in both hiring of unauthorized workers and the commission of un-
fair labor practices.94 Yet despite this potential cohesion, the
current remedial structure incentivizes violations of both types of
unlawful activity. As a result, authorized employees are more likely
than ever to find themselves personally impacted by the harm
caused by insufficient remedies for employers’ violations in cases
involving their unauthorized coworkers. The need to address the
remedial hole for authorized employees is even more critical in a
world where the proclivity for violations is high. Before suggesting
how to fill that hole and remedy the harm to authorized workers,
the next section of this Article surveys how and why the current
structure incentivizes employers to act unlawfully under both stat-
utes. Because violations are felt by authorized employees as much as
unauthorized workers, understanding the impetus to commit un-
fair labor practices in workplaces that include unauthorized
workers helps identify the nature of the harm that must be
remedied.
This section will first discuss the minimal cost of the NLRA viola-
tions for certain employers who employ unauthorized workers.
Next, it will discuss the vulnerability of unauthorized employees,
which contributes to the temptation to violate the Act in ways that
affect all employees. This section goes on to consider the financial
savings and other costs associated with a potential violation. Finally,
it will touch on the use of immigration status to thwart the purposes
of NLRA, leading to adverse workplace consequences for all.
A. Violations of the NLRA in Cases Involving Unauthorized Workers
Presently Carry Little Meaningful Cost
Successfully balancing remedial incentives means inducing two
parties—employers and undocumented workers—to each adhere
94. Elaine Dewhurst, Models of Protection of the Right of Irregular Immigrants to Backpay: The
Impact of the Interconnection Between Immigration Law and Labor Law, 35 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J.
217, 226 (2014). Dewhurst examines what a robust set of remedies against violations of both
the IRCA and the NLRA could look like from an employer’s perspective, recognizing that
ideally
immigration law sanctions employers for hiring irregular immigrants (a disincentive)
and labor law provides rights to such immigrants that can be enforced against the
employer (a further disincentive). These dual disincentives work together to discour-
age employers from hiring irregular immigrants in the first instance, thereby reducing
the availability and the pull factor enticing irregular immigrants to a state.
Id.
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to two statutes in two different ways.95 But Hoffman and its progeny
mean the employer is incentivized to violate the NLRA rather than
follow it, because the cost of violation is relatively low. Without
backpay or reinstatement remedies made available to the employ-
ees, the employer faces little direct financial harm because of its
unfair labor practices. If an employer violates the remaining terms
of a settlement or Board order (such as notice posting, access, etc.)
or engages in similar unfair labor practices, it may be subject to
contempt proceedings before a court.96 Some say these proceedings
are sufficient not only to deter an employer from subsequent un-
lawful conduct but also to reassure employees of the sanctity of
their rights. For example, the Supreme Court majority in Sure-Tan
maintained that “were petitioners [i.e. the employers] to engage in
similar illegal conduct, they would be subject to contempt proceed-
ings and penalties. This threat of contempt sanctions thereby
provides a significant deterrent against future violations of the
Act.”97 Yet the impact of the loss of employees’ mental confidence in
their ability to safely exercise their legal rights under the NLRA
means that once may be enough if there is no counterbalance spe-
cifically restoring the authorized employees.98
The employer may also be incentivized to violate the IRCA by
hiring unauthorized workers in the first instance. “Employers would
weigh the reduction in employment liability gained by hiring unau-
thorized workers against the risk of [the IRCA’s] fines. Given the
95. I distinguish here between the argument that unauthorized workers may not be
aware of their labor rights when deciding to immigrate on the one hand, and the workers’
existing knowledge that their status does not permit them to work legally. I also recognize
that some employers may have satisfied their obligations under immigration laws due to the
relatively low bar to confirm eligibility for employment.
96. See 29 CFR § 101.15 (2017) (outlining that after a Board order has been enforced
by a circuit court, it falls to the Board to assess and obtain compliance with that decree. If the
respondent has failed to comply, the General Counsel may petition the court to find the
respondent in contempt and order remedial actions and penalties).
97. Sure-Tan, Inc., v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 n.13 (1983). Interestingly, the Court did
uphold the Board’s cease-and-desist remedy, while also giving a nod to the possible inade-
quacy in existing Board remedies and the chance that reinstatement with backpay could do
more to offer relief to the discriminatees while also deterring future misconduct by the em-
ployer. Id. at 898 n.8, 900 n.10.
98. The Board and General Counsel have recognized the “once is enough” problem in
cases involving union organizing. See, e.g., Eddyleon Chocolate Co., 301 N.L.R.B. 887, 891
(1991), Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, to All Reg’l Dirs., Of-
ficers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Memorandum GC 11-01 (Dec. 20, 2010), https://
apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458042ba39; Memorandum from Lafe E. Solo-
mon, Acting Gen. Counsel, to All Reg’l Dirs., Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers,
Memorandum GC 10-07, 1 (Sept. 30, 2010), https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/
09031d4580989438 (nip-in-the-bud campaign). I submit that the principle applies equally to
cases involving violations targeting unauthorized workers and impacted authorized
employees.
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improbability of actual prosecution by immigration authorities,
many employers might seek to hire unauthorized workers as an ex-
plicit management strategy.”99 The General Counsel of the AFL-
CIO offered examples of ways employers capitalize on the skewed
incentive structure in his 2007 testimony before the House of Rep-
resentatives. He  explained that employers often call for
immigration raids on their own facilities when they suspect there is
union organizing activity, reasoning that the price of immigration
fines is relatively low, the labor law backpay is virtually non-existent,
and the cost of unionization is enormous over the long term.100
With the chance of fewer consequences for violations of the NLRA
and a relatively low bar to prove the requisite status investigation
under the IRCA, it becomes tempting indeed for employers to
break the law.
B. Vulnerability of Employees
The number of unauthorized residents willing to enter the
workforce means that it is not difficult for an unscrupulous em-
ployer to act on that temptation, undercutting the goals of both
IRCA and the NLRA. The Pew Research Center reports that out of
approximately 11.2 million unauthorized immigrants in the United
States, 8.1 million were members of the nation’s civilian labor force
in 2012, making up fully 5.1% of the workforce.101 Nevada has the
largest number of unauthorized laborers, followed by California
99. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM.
U.L. REV. 1361, 1395 (2009); see also Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S.
137, 155 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the
Line After Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for Protecting Undocumented
Workers in the Title VII Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 473, 490–91 (2005).
100. Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Labor Movement Perspectives: Hearing Before Subcomm.
on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 23–24 (2007) (testimony of Jonathan P. Hiatt, General Counsel, AFL-CIO) at
14–15. As one author put it in the immigration context, “[t]hose violators who are caught
and assessed penalties, and can afford to pay the fines, simply pay them as part of the cost of
doing business. Since they are rarely reinspected to ensure continued compliance, they re-
peatedly violate the law.” Lora Jo Foo, The Informal Economy: The Vulnerable and Exploitable
Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J.
2179, 2187 (1994).
101. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’vera Cohen, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in
14, PEW RES. CTR: HISP. TRENDS (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/11/18/
unauthorized-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7-states-fall-in-14/; Unauthorized Immigrant Population
Trends for States, Birth Countries, and Regions, PEW RES. CTR: HISP. TRENDS (Nov. 3, 2016), http:/
/www.pewhispanic.org/2014/12/11/unauthorized-trends/.
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and Texas.102 A Pew analysis also shows that in most states, the larg-
est number of unauthorized immigrant workers are concentrated
in service occupations, which include maids, cooks, and ground-
skeepers; unauthorized workers make up the highest share of the
overall workforce in farming occupations in most states.103
Lora Jo Foo notes that the underground economy means that
employers can fairly readily evade taxes, minimum wage and hour
statutes, and other worker protections.104 IRCA plays no small part
in these violations: the Commission on Agricultural Workers, a
Congressionally created panel, concluded that rather than stopping
unauthorized work, IRCA created a market for false documenta-
tion.105 Because IRCA provides an affirmative defense to liability for
employers that in good faith verify an applicant’s eligibility to
work,106 businesses are incentivized to accept even questionable
documents and forgers have a ready market in unauthorized work-
ers who may have come to the United States specifically to find
work.107 Once in the system, the employer may be more confident
in its ability to skirt liability given (1) the threat of exposure it holds
over employees; (2) limited remedies under labor law; and (3) the
employer’s knowledge that it has a defense under immigration law.
Although documented workers risk retaliation if they assert their
statutory rights, “undocumented workers confront the harsher real-
ity that, in addition to possible discharge, their employer will likely
report them to the INS and they will be subjected to deportation
proceedings or criminal prosecution.”108
102. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’vera Cohen, Size of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Workforce Stable
After the Great Recession: Appendix B: Additional Charts, PEW RES. CTR: HISP. TRENDS (NOV. 3,
2016), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/11/03/appendix-b-additional-charts-2/#among-
states.
103. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’vera Cohen, Share of Unauthorized Immigrant Workers in Production,
Construction Jobs Falls Since 2007, PEW RES. CTR: HISP. TRENDS (Mar. 26, 2015), http://
www.pewhispanic.org/2015/03/26/share-of-unauthorized-immigrant-workers-in-production-
construction-jobs-falls-since-2007/.
104. Foo, supra note 100, at 2180, 2187 (using garment workers as an examples). Foo’s
observations regarding the context that may prompt certain employers to hire unauthorized
workers are relevant to understanding the skewed incentives discussed in this Article, but this
Article expresses no view as to whether her conclusions regarding the need to strengthen
protections for such workers are desirable.
105. Id. at 2182–83.
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3), (b) (2012).
107. Foo, supra note 100, at 2183.
108. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Jennifer Berman,
The Needle and the Damage Done: How Hoffman Plastics Promotes Sweatshops and Illegal Immigra-
tion and What to Do About It, 13 KAN. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 585, 588–89 (2004); Leticia M. Saucedo &
Maria Cristina Morales, Voices Without Law: The Border Crossing Stories and Workplace Attitudes of
Immigrants, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 641, 654–55 (2012).
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The effect from unregulated labor is equally poignant for other
workplace laws, including widespread minimum wage and overtime
violations. Kati Griffith observes that according to 2008 surveys,
“low-wage undocumented workers are more than twice as likely to
suffer minimum wage violations” as compared to authorized work-
ers, with 37.1 percent of undocumented workers experiencing a
violation in the week before the survey was conducted; 85% exper-
ienced an overtime violation during that period.109 Reports suggest
that Hoffman further exacerbated employers’ leverage in skirting
workplace laws such as the NLRA by strengthening the threat of
deportation even though backpay denials would have no direct
bearing on that possibility.110
Due to these skewed incentives, the original goals prompting
Congress to enact the NLRA in 1935—to promote industrial peace,
remove barriers to the free flow of commerce caused by industrial
strife between workers and corporations, protect the right of em-
ployees and employers, and address the inequality between the
parties111—are now undermined. Particularly in an economy in
which employers already have an overwhelming degree of leverage
and unionization rates are down, the weakened NLRA remedies
could give rise to greater risk of work disruptions, low wage rates,
and the erosion of fundamental rights for authorized employees.112
C. Financial Costs and Savings
As noted above, the nature of unauthorized work and fear of ex-
posure makes it easier for employers seeking a business advantage
to violate wage and hour laws. The same may be said for the cost-
109. Kati L. Griffith, Undocumented Workers: Crossing the Borders of Immigration and Workplace
Law, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 611, 616 (2012) (citing data collected and reported by
Annette Bernhardt).
110. See Raquel E. Aldana, The Subordination and Anti-Subordination Story of the U.S. Immi-
grant Experience in the 21st Century, 7 NEV. L.J. 713, 721 (2007); Ruben J. Garcia, Ten Years After
Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: The Power of a Labor Law Symbol, 21 CORNELL J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 659, 667–68 (2012).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
112. See The Great Recession, ECON. POL’Y INST.: ST. WORKING AM., http://stateofworkin-
gamerica.org/great-recession/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20171201194427/http://
stateofworkingamerica.org/great-recession/] (last visited Nov. 30, 2017); The Great Recession:
The Jobs Shortage, ECON. POL’Y INST.: ST. WORKING AM., http://stateofworkingamerica.org/
great-recession/the-job-shortage/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20171201194521/http://
stateofworkingamerica.org/great-recession/the-job-shortage/] (last visited Nov. 30, 2017);
Union Coverage Rate in the United States, 1973–2013, ECON. POL’Y INST.: ST. WORKING AM.,
http://stateofworkingamerica.org/charts/union-coverage-rate-in-the-united-states-1973-
2009/ [(last updated Aug. 27, 2014) (showing a drop in the unionization rate from 26.7% in
1973 to 13.6% in 2009).
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savings in violating the NLRA by interfering with attempts to union-
ize—violations that ultimately harm authorized workers as well. In a
sense, therefore, these employers may be receiving a windfall under
the current remedial structure akin to that which the system tries to
avoid by denying backpay to unauthorized workers.113 Calculated
across industries, full-time wage and salary union members in the
United States earned a median weekly pay of $1,004 per week in
2016, while their non-unionized counterparts had median weekly
earnings of $802.114 Backpay after an unfair labor practice repre-
sents an entirely separate cost; the Board ordered approximately
$94.3 million in total backpay relief in 2015.115
In a facility in which authorized and unauthorized workers work
together (as may easily be the case in many facilities), the incentive
structure created by the current remedial doctrine may allow the
employer to reap a compounded windfall. First is the opportunity
to start at a lower wage rate with the threat of exposure for unau-
thorized employees. Second is the knowledge that there is no risk
of backpay or reinstatement costs should a violation be found. Cou-
pled with the realization that one violation can be enough to
dampen collective activity even among authorized employees who
observe the employer’s violations pass with less-than-full conse-
quences, the employer may have created a perfect storm for a long-
term success story.
D. Use of Immigration Status to Thwart the Purposes of the NLRA
An employer aware of the limited remedies available to unautho-
rized employees may also take advantage of an employee’s
immigration status to thwart the effective enforcement of the NLRA
with respect to the rest of its workforce. For example, an employer
may terminate an employee based on his or her immigration status
as a pretext for retaliation after protected concerted activities that
113. Correales, supra note 10, at 139–40.
114. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members -
2016 (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [hereinafter BLS
Union Members].
115. Monetary Remedies, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/
graphs-data/remedies/monetary-remedies [https://web.archive.org/web/20171201195912/
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/remedies/monetary-remedies] (last vis-
ited Nov. 30, 2017). In 2015, the Board received 20,199 unfair labor practice charges,
achieved settlements in 6,473 cases, and issued complaints in 1,272 matters. Charges and Com-
plaints, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/charges-
and-complaints/charges-and-complaints [https://web.archive.org/web/20171201200033/
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/charges-and-complaints/charges-and-
complaints] (last visited Nov. 30, 2017).
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affect the workforce overall, knowing that the employer has the de-
fense of attempting to comply with the IRCA and is relatively secure
against remedies under the NLRA due to the employee’s immigra-
tion status. Alternatively, an employer may respond to general
protected concerted activity by unlawfully terminating an employee
with a non-immigrant work authorization conditioned on employ-
ment, causing that employee to lose status along with the
opportunity for backpay under the NLRA.
The Board has attempted to limit the possibility of such abuses.
After Hoffman Plastic, employers began asserting that alleged dis-
criminatees were undocumented and therefore ineligible for
backpay or reinstatement under Hoffman Plastics. To support their
positions, employers served subpoenas on discriminatees, demand-
ing proof of work authorization and putting them at risk of
intimidation. In Flaum Appetizing Corp,116 the Board responded,
holding that the “IRCA does not require that the Board permit
baseless inquiry into immigration status in every case in which rein-
statement or backpay is granted.”117 Instead, an employer was
barred from asserting an affirmative defense based on Hoffman Plas-
tics absent a factual foundation for doing so.118 Yet it is unclear
whether the Flaum standard is sufficient to overcome the incentives
towards the violation described above, particularly as violations may
go underreported.
III. RESULTANT HARM FOR AUTHORIZED EMPLOYEES
Current interpretations and incentives in cases involving unau-
thorized employees mean that when an employer violates the
NLRA, authorized employees are also discouraged from exercising
their fundamental rights after seeing little has been done to repair
116. Flaum Appetizing Corp., 357 N.L.R.B. 2006 (2011).
117. Id. at 2012.
118. Id. The federal courts have also faced this question in the context of employment
litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. In Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057 (9th
Cir. 2004), the court considered whether an employer could assert an employee’s unautho-
rized status as a defense against backpay when evidence of the employee’s unlawful status was
acquired after the employer’s alleged unlawful conduct. Id. at 1071–72. Applying the after-
acquired evidence doctrine, the court held that “District courts need not condone the use of
discovery to engage in ‘fishing expedition[s]’” and can “invoke the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure when necessary to prevent employers from using the discovery process to engage
in wholesale searches for evidence that might serve to limit its damages for its wrongful con-
duct.” Id. at 1072.
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the harm done.119 This harm makes it that much more important to
rebalance employers’ cost/benefit analyses to uphold the core pur-
pose of the NLRA: giving employees the freedom to choose to join
together in a concerted manner for mutual aid and protection in
the workplace, or refrain from doing so as they choose. It is this
point that easily gets lost in the scholarly discussion of incentives
and compliance.
This section will first discuss how the unlawful labor practices for
unauthorized workers erode the NLRA’s collective goals for all em-
ployees. After then addressing the ramifications of violations on the
terms and conditions of employment for authorized workers, it will
identify and examine the decrease in mental confidence among
those authorized workers that results from the inadequately reme-
died violations.
A. Erosion of the NLRA’s Collective Goals
From the beginning, the NLRA has maintained a group orienta-
tion.120 Congress enacted the statute to ensure employees’ freedom
“to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .”121 In
this context, “concerted” generally includes situations when two or
more employees take action for their mutual aid or protection re-
garding terms and conditions of employment, but it may also
include a single employee acting for the group, trying to induce
group action, or preparing for group action.122 The overriding com-
monality of their action is the center of the concerted element of
119. See Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 848, 848 (1977) (“The Board has
decided that serious threats, even if made to a single employee, cannot be regarded as iso-
lated, but are presumed to be the subject of discussion and repetition among the workers.”).
The need to repair the damper on employees’ exercise of their rights underlines the “nip-in-
the-bud” initiative. See Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon, Memorandum GC 11-01, supra
note 98, at 5 (“I want to ensure that, in addition to swiftly remedying unlawful discharges, the
impact of these ancillary unfair labor practices is removed as well. In order to remove the
impact, we must tailor remedies to recreate an atmosphere that allows employees to fully
utilize their statutory right to exercise their free choice.”). I suggest the same can be said for
the employees left behind after egregious violations involving unauthorized workers.
120. Ellen Dannin, No Rights Without A Remedy: The Long Struggle For Effective National Labor
Relations Act Remedies, AM. CONST. SOC’Y L. & POL’Y ISSUE BRIEF, 2011, at 17 (“Congress in-
tended the rights and protections of [of the Act] to be collective.”).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
122. Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986), aff’d sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1205 (1988).
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the NLRA.123 “Mutual aid and protection” is also infused with the
collective: the employee must be acting for a collective goal, not a
personal gripe.124
Hoffman and its progeny, however, have turned away from the
collective nature of the statute. As a result, authorized employees
may be losing the full value of their fundamental rights under the
NLRA, at least when working with unauthorized workers, as existing
incentives tempt employers towards non-compliance. Ellen Dan-
nin’s analysis of the oral arguments in Hoffman touches on part of
the problem.125 Dannin points to Justice Scalia’s questioning re-
garding the impossibility of the unauthorized worker to mitigate
any alleged losses, given that working would further violate the
IRCA.126 For Justice Scalia, a “wily discriminatee” could take advan-
tage of a “hapless employer” by making this argument, an action
just as bad as the employer’s violation.127 Scalia’s approach, Dannin
argues, turns the intent and analysis of the NLRA on its head:
“Under the NLRA, only the discriminator’s intent matters. But the
analysis advocated by justices who joined the Hoffman Plastics’ ma-
jority ‘rewrote’ the NLRA to shift that inquiry to reverse the roles of
victim and victimizer.”128 Rather than focusing on whether the em-
ployer’s objective actions and intent violated the law, the majority’s
focus fell on the individual employee’s background, intent, and ac-
tions—an odd approach for analyzing a statute rooted in the rights
of employees to band together collectively to address the common
terms and conditions of their employment.
Kati Griffith makes similar observations regarding the divisions
between authorized and unauthorized employees created under
Hoffman. Under current law, even if an employee is unauthorized to
work, he may still share a community of interest in the workplace
with authorized employees sufficient to be included in the same
union.129 But if, as Hoffman requires, unauthorized workers have dif-
ferent remedial rights under the NLRA, divisions are likely to form
that can ultimately harm the ability of authorized workers to act
regarding their conditions of employment. In contrast, focusing on
123. See Wyndham Resort Dev. Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. 765, 767 (2011) (highlighting the
commonality of a goal, even if no advance plan was made to act together, and even if employ-
ees had different motives for their action).
124. See Holling Press, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 301, 302 (2004); Gartner-Harf Co., 308 N.L.R.B.
531, 531 n.1 (1992).
125. Ellen Dannin, Hoffman Plastics as Labor Law—Equality At Last for Immigrant Workers?,
44 U.S.F. L. REV. 393 (2009).
126. Id. at 400–02.
127. Id. at 401.
128. Id.
129. Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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the collective nature of the statute can foster a sense of common
cause, becoming a “legitimacy-builder that unifies documented and
undocumented workers around their mutual interests as work-
ers.”130 Griffith focuses on the possibilities of unity in support of
broad advocacy,131 but the point is equally applicable on the micro
level of the workplace. Without attention to the effects of focusing
on the unauthorized worker’s possible IRCA violation and the rela-
tive minimization of the employer’s NLRA violations, the shared
identity and willingness to join together for the collective bargain-
ing so central to the labor statute is at risk for authorized workers.132
I join Dannin and Griffith in affirming the focus on the collec-
tive. The NLRA was enacted to protect workers as a group, not as
isolated individuals.133 A collective focus creates a stable long term
relationship between workers and management developed through
bargaining that goes beyond a one-on-one affinity/dislike.134 Ex-
isting law already recognizes that authorized and unauthorized
workers can share a community of interest sufficient to place them
in the same bargaining unit under the NLRA; erosion of the group
based on Hoffman outcomes threatens that community and effec-
tiveness of concerted action.135 But the current remedial structure
not only creates a subclass of employees that lack a stake in the
goals of their authorized co-workers, but also erodes the willingness
130. Kati L. Griffith & Tamara L. Lee, Immigration Advocacy as Labor Advocacy, 33 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 73, 112–13 (2012).
131. See id. Griffith takes the approach of framing “immigration advocacy as labor advo-
cacy” using the NLRA to support a range of activity in support of the rights of immigrant and
undocumented workers. This approach relies in large part on fostering solidarity between
authorized and unauthorized workers. See id. at 111–12.
132. Meaningful exercise of rights under the NLRA are undermined even further when
given that “[e]mployees without significant protection from unlawful discharge on the basis
of their union activity are not likely to elect union representation because they do not have a
comparable stake in the collective goals of their legally resident co-workers.” Andrew S.
Lewinter, Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB: An Invitation to Exploit, 20 GA. ST. U.L. REV.
509, 535 (2003) (internal quotations omitted).
133. As one scholar put it, the NLRA “reduced certain individual values to secondary
status.” James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1563, 1565 (1996).
134. See NLRB v. Financial Institution Employees, Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192, 208 (1986)
(“the basic purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to preserve industrial peace. The
Act includes several provisions designed to encourage stable bargaining relationships, and
the Board has devised rules to achieve the same ends.”) (internal citations omitted).
135. Notably for the question of unity, Agri Processor confirmed that both authorized and
unauthorized employees could share a community of interest and be properly placed in the
same bargaining unit. Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also
Memorandum from Arthur Rosenfeld, Memorandum GC 02-06, supra note 84, at 2–3 (citing
cases and instructing that the Office of the General Counsel would continue treating them as
such).
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and ability of authorized employees to exercise their rights and im-
pedes effective collective bargaining for the entire facility.136
Recognizing the importance of a shared employee identity to the
operation of the NLRA, some unions have begun organizing at-
tempts involving unauthorized workers.137 This Article takes no
position on whether such attempts to secure additional rights or
remedies for this group are desirable, either as a social or political
matter. Yet should a union begin an organizing campaign and meet
with a positive employee reaction, it may press further—and learn
that some employees are unauthorized to work. It is conceivable
that, at least in some cases, the union will then back away from or-
ganizing to avoid unwanted publicity. Outside organizers can
quickly realize that the employer may be immunized against conse-
quences for unfair labor practices against those unauthorized
employees and that union pressure might result in heightened scru-
tiny for the authorized employees with whom they work. The
possibility for unionization is further weakened when one realizes
that unauthorized employees without protection from unlawful dis-
charge on the basis of their union activity are less likely to vote for
union representation because they do not have a comparable stake
in the collective goals of their authorized co-workers or share their
confidence in the union’s ability to support their goals. As a result,
the opportunity for authorized employees to exercise their right
under the NLRA to choose union representation is undermined.
Should a facility with both unauthorized and authorized workers
manage to organize a union,138 an unscrupulous employer may be
motivated to use the strained relationship between the NLRA and
the IRCA to oust the chosen representatives of its lawful, authorized
employees. Under the NLRA, if an employer commits an egregious
violation and refuses to bargain with a union, it may face an unfair
labor practice charge ultimately resulting in an order to bargain—
even if there are unauthorized employees in the unit.139 But in this
136. Agri Processor Co., 514 F.3d at 8 (citing Sure-Tan, Inc., v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1983)).
Jennifer Berman identifies similar risks in her analysis of the ways Hoffman adversely impacts
attempts to unionize for lawful employees. Berman, supra note 108, at 603.
137. See Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 545
n.141–42 (2007) (citing data and sources).
138. Agri Processor Co, Inc., 514 F.3d at 9; Memorandum from Arthur Rosenfeld, Memo-
randum GC 02-06, supra note 84, at 2–3 (citing cases).
139. E.g., Agri Processor Co., 347 N.L.R.B. 1200, 1200 n.2 (2006) (“[U]nless and until the
employees are declared to be illegal and are discharged and/or deported, they remain em-
ployees of the Respondent, they remain employees under the Act, they lawfully voted in the
election that the Union won, and since the Union lawfully represents the bargaining unit, we
do not think it ‘peculiar’ to require the Respondent to bargain with the Union.”); Abramson,
LLC, 345 N.L.R.B. 171, 176 (2005).
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context, it is highly probable that the status of its unauthorized em-
ployees will already have been exposed, and those employees may
now face immigration violations or deportation.140 Without the full
unit, the employer might try to claim that the union lacks majority
support from the remaining authorized employees. Whether or not
this argument is successful,141 it is unlikely that those authorized
employees will try to exercise their rights again, knowing that they
risk another backlash from their employer.
B. Terms and Conditions of Employment
Wages and other terms and conditions of employment for au-
thorized employees are also at risk when employers face fewer
consequences for violations of the NLRA. When “unscrupulous em-
ployers can exploit some low-wage workers with impunity, all low-
wage workers suffer compromised employment protections and ec-
onomic security.”142 The NLRA’s collective nature contemplates
that workers gain in strength when they join in mutual aid with
respect to the terms and conditions of their employment. But when
authorized employees are constrained in their ability to effectively
act because violations against part of the workforce carry a different
risk than against another, they are unable to work together towards
change in their mutual terms and conditions of employment.
This inability may result in wages and working conditions below
the industry standard. When an employer is incentivized to hire un-
authorized workers (in violation of the IRCA) and can create a
sufficient business rationalization for committing unfair labor prac-
tices against them (in violation of the NLRA), lawful employees face
140. See Deportable Aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012) (deportable aliens); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a) (2012) (detention and removal of aliens ordered removed).
141. A union enjoys a presumption of majority support for a certain time after an elec-
tion; the Board frequently rejects employer arguments to the contrary when they rest on a
claim of changed circumstances. See, e.g., Grane Healthcare Co., 6-CA-36791, 2010 N.L.R.B.
LEXIS 505, *19–20 (Dec. 16, 2010) (stating reasons for majority presumption); Pearson
Educ., Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 979, 980 n.6 (2001) (citing cases). While there may still be ques-
tions regarding the application of the Board’s position to a given case, the fact that the
employer’s argument may still be made raises concerns regarding the effect of litigation and
a challenge to the Union’s ability to represent its members on the mindset of the authorized
employees.
142. EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO & REBECCA SMITH, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WORKERS’
RIGHTS ON ICE: HOW IMMIGRATION REFORM CAN STOP RETALIATION AND ADVANCE LABOR
RIGHTS 1 (2013).
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a race-to-the-bottom to remain competitive.143 The Board itself has
recognized this danger, as expressed in then-Chairman Liebman
and Member Pearce’s concurrence in Mezonos Maven Bakery:
[Although] Congress sought through IRCA to protect the in-
terests of U.S. citizens and authorized-alien workers . . .
undocumented immigrants, fearing detection and deporta-
tion, will work long hours, accept low wages, and tolerate
substandard conditions. Thus, they possess a competitive edge
in the labor market[,] particularly in the market for unskilled
labor [,] over U.S. citizens and other authorized workers un-
willing to submit to such exploitation. Also, undocumented
immigrants’ availability in a labor market tends to depress
wages and working conditions for others in the same market.
By deterring employers from hiring undocumented immi-
grants, IRCA seeks to counteract these forces. To the extent
that precluding backpay awards encourages employers to hire
undocumented immigrants, it is at cross-purposes with IRCA
and injures the welfare of citizen and authorized-alien
workers.144
Yet, as will be discussed below, there is an even greater danger to
the working conditions of authorized workers: the impact on their
willingness to freely exercise their rights under the NLRA as a result
of the current inadequacy of remedies. This chill makes employees
reluctant to freely share views on wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment. It also keeps them from acquiring the
information they need to join together for mutual aid and protec-
tion regarding those terms, which depresses working conditions
and suppresses rights of even authorized employees.
143. Agri Processor Co., 514 F.3d at 5 (citing Sure-Tan, Inc., v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1983));
see also Berman, supra note 108, at 603; Griffith and Lee, supra note 130, at 102 (citing AFL-
CIO’s “Change to Win” platform).
144. Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 376, 383 (2011), aff’d in part, remanded in
part sub nom. Palma v. NLRB, 723 F.3d 176, 187 (2d Cir. 2013).
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C. Decreased Mental Confidence Due to Inadequately
Remedied Violations
The same reverse incentive structure that fails to effectively deter
employers from violating the NLRA also diminishes the fundamen-
tal rights of authorized employees when they self-censor.145
Authorized workers may limit communications in front of unautho-
rized coworkers, thereby also limiting opportunities to talk to each
other.146 They may under-report other violations, lose some of their
collective power, or even choose not to report at all, deeming it a
futile exercise without more support.147 When, as with the NLRA, a
law depends so heavily on employees acting as “private attorneys
general who will pull the workplace law fire alarm when necessary,”
this kind of intimidation undermines the entire system of
operations.148
The Office of the General Counsel has recognized that “no
worker in his right mind would participate in a union campaign in
[a] plant after having observed that other workers had previously
attempted to exercise rights protected by the Act have been dis-
charged and must wait for three years to have their rights
vindicated.”149 This observation is equally applicable to other forms
of collective action when, under Hoffman, the employer escapes two
of the most common remedies (backpay and reinstatement) for vio-
lations of the NLRA if the targeted employee is unauthorized. Just
one violation can thwart an entire union movement when workers
are vulnerable and create a “legacy of coercion” for the remaining
authorized workers.150 Authorized employees will not always know
whether a coworker is unauthorized or not. Once they become
aware of the termination of the unauthorized employee, they may
145. This is a particularly poignant risk when an employer commits multiple violations, or
when those violations occur during union organizing. At these times, violating the NLRA
“inhibit[s] employees from engaging in union activity and dr[ies] up channels of communi-
cation between employees. Thus, in order to provide an effective remedy in these cases, it is
just as necessary to remove that impact as it is to remove the impact caused by an unlawful
discharge.” Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon, Memorandum GC 11-01, supra note 98, at
2.
146. See id. at 4 nn.10–12 (citing cases).
147. When, as Justice Thurgood Marshall noted, the focus of the NLRA is collective, this
effect is even more dangerous. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Comm. Org., 420
U.S. 50, 62 (1975).
148. Griffith, Undocumented Workers, supra note 109, at 631.
149. Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon, Memorandum GC 10-07, supra note 98, at 1.
150. Garvey Marine, Inc. v. NLRB, 245 F.3d 819, 827–28 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (affirming the
bargaining order); Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 376, 380 (2011) (Chairman
Liebman and Member Pearce, concurring), aff’d in part, remanded in part sub nom. Palma v.
NLRB, 723 F.3d 176, 187 (2d Cir. 2013).
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think twice before engaging in protected activity with their co-work-
ers out of fear the employer will then target them.151 Because of the
paucity of demonstrable remedies for their colleagues, they may
conclude that they too are unprotected.152 As the employer’s unlaw-
ful actions become part of the lore of the shop, employees’ mental
confidence in the legal system as well as in the meaning of their
rights under the Act is shaken; traditional remedies under the
NLRA often do little to address this erosion of the so-called status
quo. “Indeed, rather than removing harm to employee collective
action and union support caused by employer illegal action, co-
workers may become afraid of the consequences of asserting their
legal rights to organize, support one another, or bargain
collectively.”153
The available data bears out the danger. Although admittedly
limited, a survey of low-wage workers in three cities found that em-
ployers do, in fact, threaten to call immigration authorities.154
Nearly half of all employees who were retaliated against for filing
workplace complaints or considering unionization were threatened
with termination or exposure to immigration officials.155 Additional
empirical research is necessary to provide a deeper view into the
mechanics and extent of the chill on authorized employees after
seeing these types of NLRA violations. Nevertheless, at least some
statistically-significant harm seems to flow to those authorized em-
ployees from the remedial structure governing violations involving
unauthorized employees. This harm, though an unintended conse-
quence, underlines the need for reform—regardless of what
protections and rights unauthorized workers should enjoy.
151. See, e.g., Thomas J. Walsh, Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB: How the Supreme
Court Eroded Labor Law and Workers Rights in the Name of Immigration Policy, 21 LAW & INEQ. 313,
336 (2003).
152. Mezonos Maven Bakery, 357 N.L.R.B. at 381 (Chairman Liebman and Member
Pearce, concurring) (“One purpose of a backpay order is to make all employees at a jobsite,
regardless of whether they themselves were the target of unfair labor practices, more confi-
dent in the exercise of their statutory rights. One result of precluding backpay for
undocumented workers will be to make authorized workers less confident in asserting those
rights.”) (internal quotations omitted) (footnote omitted).
153. Dannin, No Rights Without A Remedy, supra note 120, at 17; see also Berman, supra note
108, at 602; Nancy Schiffer, AFL-CIO, Rights Without Remedies: The Failure of the National Labor
Relations Act, ABA SEC. LAB. & EMP. L., Sept. 10–13, 2008, at 7, http://apps.americanbar.org/
labor/lel-annualcle/08/materials/data/papers/153.pdf (“The harm to the workers’ organiz-
ing campaign and their support for their union, as well as the harm to the community and to
the general enforcement needs of the Act are repeatedly ignored. . . . [Remedies such as
backpay and reinstatement] may ‘make whole’ the workers directly affected, but they serve
no remedial purpose for workers whose union support has been crushed and fail to serve as a
deterrent for other employers contemplating similar wrong-doing.”).
154. Griffith, Undocumented Workers, supra note 109, at 631–32.
155. Id. at 632.
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As a hypothetical, imagine that an employer terminates Sam’s
employment (an unauthorized employee) after he discussed the
employer’s overtime and leave policies with John (an authorized
employee). Imagine further that this discussion was overheard by
two other authorized employees, Jane and Joe. Because the discus-
sion constitutes protected activity, Sam’s termination would
normally constitute an unlawful unfair labor practice warranting
Sam’s reinstatement and an award of backpay. But because he was
working without authorization, current law bars those remedies.
And what then of Jane and Joe, authorized employees who ob-
served or heard of—but were not a part of—Sam and John’s
discussion? They became aware of both the discussion and the em-
ployer’s unlawful actions, including the termination, and they
would likely think twice before engaging in additional protected ac-
tivity with their other colleagues out of fear that the employer will
repeat the violations with them as the targets. Addressing this chil-
ling effect has been cited as grounds for reinstatement and other
remedies. In this example, however, Jane and Joe have not seen
such mitigation: the two primary tools in the remedial toolbox for
such situations have been eliminated because of Sam’s unautho-
rized status. If Jane and Joe are unaware of the legal nuances that
make Sam’s unauthorized status the reason for the limited remedy,
or are simply unaware of his status altogether, they may assume that
subsequent violations against even authorized workers such as
themselves will result in the same limited relief.
Despite the majority view in Hoffman, an argument can be made
that remedies such as notice readings and the possibility of compli-
ance hearings serve little use to remedy the chill on the remaining
employees or prevent subsequent violations. Here again is an exam-
ple of the “once-is-enough” argument: even if an employer does not
commit a subsequent violation, the harm to Jane, Joe, and other
employees who hear of the incident may already have been done.
Because Sam was the original target, authorized, protected workers
are left with no readily available remedy against their employer’s
misconduct toward them unless the employer terminates their em-
ployment or engages in other forms of retaliation. Yet they too
experience direct harm from the violation. This lies largely unad-
dressed under the current schema of analysis for unfair labor
practices against unauthorized workers.
Chills and loss of confidence result in self-censoring even before
the unauthorized employee is called to account. Authorized em-
ployees such as Jane, Joe, and John may limit their protected
concerted activities in front of a coworker, such as Sam, whom they
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know to be unauthorized—thereby also limiting opportunities for
communications with each other. And effectively, Jane, Joe, and
John cede the right to exercise their Section 7 rights out of fear that
there will be no clear right to a strong remedy for any of them if an
unauthorized worker is involved. For Sam, the risk of speaking with
fellow employees and consequently exposing his own immigration
violations should the employer’s attention be focused on their con-
certed activity may well be too high. The risk is higher when the
employer’s own risk-reduction calculus leads it to naturally single
out Sam should any activity take place among the group, given the
limited remedies in play. Self-censoring can also take the form of
lower reporting of unfair labor practices by authorized employees.
If unauthorized employees abandon or choose not to participate in
claims, the remaining authorized employees will lose some of the
collective power of their arguments and struggle to show the extent
of the employer’s violations. In turn, they may then choose not to
report at all, deeming it to be a futile exercise without broad sup-
port. Because the NLRA is structured as a collective statute, a
significant unintended consequence comes from under-enforce-
ment and under-reporting—more so than in statutes permitting a
private right of action. Likewise, when employees hesitate to share
views on wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, even authorized employees are kept from acquiring the
information they need to join together for mutual aid and protec-
tion regarding those terms.
IV. LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH FOCUSING ON REMEDIES
FOR UNAUTHORIZED WORKERS
The legal community has wrestled with the challenge of
rebalancing the critical incentives discussed in this Article to no
general agreement. Because the proposals to date generally focus
on unauthorized workers, the controversy surrounding their treat-
ment and rights has stalled progress on remedying the effect of the
violations on the rest of the workforce: the authorized workers and
their willingness to exercise their rights. Some of the proposals may
also inadvertently undermine the policy underlying the NLRA itself
and inadvertently allow opponents of the Act to call into question
the integrity of those who administer it. Most of these, unfortu-
nately, focus on unauthorized workers.
This section offers a literature review that analyzes some of the
suggested remedial approaches in unauthorized worker cases. It di-
vides them by their general approaches and considers the
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implications of each group for impacted authorized employees as
well as the integrity and purpose of the NLRA. The following sec-
tion then offers modest proposals to address the under-recognized
harm to authorized employees.
A. Reform the NLRA
Those who advocate for reforming the NLRA call for Congres-
sional action such as creating more deterrent mechanisms against
employer violations. Some also advocate moving to punitive dam-
ages, which have been traditionally excluded under the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the NLRA.156 Approximately three years
after the passage of the Act, the Supreme Court announced in Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. NLRB that the NLRA authorizes the Board to
issue a cease-and-desist order and take other affirmative actions, but
that “the power to command affirmative action is remedial, not pu-
nitive.”157 The Court’s 1944 Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB decision left
no doubt: the Board could award backpay because it related di-
rectly to addressing the employees’ grievances, but the NLRA did
not “confer a punitive jurisdiction enabling the Board to inflict
upon the employer any penalty it may choose because he is en-
gaged in unfair labor practices even though the Board may be of
the opinion that the policies of the Act may be effectuated by such
an order.”158
While I am sympathetic with the desire to expand the scope of
remedies available under the Act, I am skeptical of legislative action
as an expedient solution. Although it may be a subject for long
term advocacy, the taboo on punitive damages and the reality of
congressional deadlock makes this, as a practical matter, a non-
starter in today’s climate. It also stalls consideration on an area of
that law that might yield more concrete progress: identifying and
remedying the harm an employer’s violation of IRCA and the
NLRA has on authorized workers and reworking the currently
skewed incentives for employer compliance.
156. E.g., James Meehan, Note, Undocumented Workers, the National Labor Relations Act, and
the Immigration Reform and Control Act: Irreconcilable Differences or a Match Made in Legal Heaven?,
43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 601, 629–34 (2014).
157. 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938).
158. 311 U.S. 7, 11–12 (2012).
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B. Rights for Unauthorized Workers
Some scholars and commentators suggest that giving additional
rights to unauthorized workers (or highlighting the rights they al-
ready have) would change an employer’s cost/benefit analysis and
incentivize it to follow the law.159 As Jarod Gonzalez noted, when
the employer knows it will not be able to take advantage of unau-
thorized employees because they might invoke at least minimal
rights under the NLRA, it may be less willing to hire them in the
first instance and avoid violating both the NLRA and the IRCA.160
Interviews with workers and those seeking to organize them indi-
cate that when workers of any status are aware of the rights they do
have, they may be more willing to speak out to expose violations.161
Limited rights may also deter the unauthorized employee from vio-
lating immigration laws by fraudulently trying to work because
fewer employers will be willing to risk violating the IRCA by hiring
him in the first place. The approach may be taken even further
with, as Michael J. Wishnie urges, reform including legalization and
temporary-worker options.162
Such proposals seem reasonable to reset incentives for compli-
ance with the law in the abstract. But when considered alongside
159. E.g., Jarod S. Gonzalez, Employment Law Remedies for Illegal Immigrants, 40 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 987, 999 (2008); Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV.
1446, 1447–48 (2008) (writing in support of immigration reform legislation, including a le-
galization option and temporary worker status); see also Saucedo & Morales, supra note 108 at
654–55. I use Professor Gonzalez’s formulation as an example for discussion here. Even
under current law, unauthorized workers are “employees” under the NLRA and technically
have the same rights as their authorized counterparts. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012); Agri
Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2008). However, the phrase “Rights Without
Remedies,” explained in Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants, in LA-
BOR LAW STORIES 399, 406 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005), among others, is
particularly apt, questioning the practical value of those “rights.”
160. Gonzalez, supra note 159 at 999.
161. See Leticia M. Saucedo, Everybody in the Tent: Lessons From the Grassroots About Labor
Organizing, Immigrants, and Temporary Worker Policies, 17 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 65, 77 (2014);
Saucedo & Morales, supra note 108 at 657. Professors Saucedo and Morales detail the various
narratives at work among unauthorized employees, including their firm belief that they lack
meaningful legal rights and the looming fear of deportation, and the effect of those narra-
tives on their willingness to exercise their rights under labor and employment laws. See
Saucedo, Everybody in the Tent, supra, at 77; Saucedo & Morales, supra note 108 at 657.
162. Wishnie, Labor Law After Legalization, supra note 159, at 1447–48. Wishnie focuses on
the benefits to unauthorized workers themselves, rather than motivating employers’ compli-
ance with labor law or the effects on authorized workers. Id. at 1451. Nevertheless, his
suggestions could be seen as the reverse of the proverbial coin: by strengthening the labor
rights of unauthorized workers via legalization and other measures, employers would be de-
terred from violations given that those employees could respond with charges and
unionization in the same way as lawful workers.
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the extensive political sentiment against increased rights for unau-
thorized workers, this approach might not be the most immediately
productive nor the most helpful for securing the rights of author-
ized employees. Moreover, to make this idea a realistic possibility,
the NLRA remedies must be (1) strong enough to impose a rela-
tively heavy loss on the employer and (2) specific enough to
prevent the unauthorized worker from getting a benefit. Even with
backpay and reinstatement in the toolkit, scholars have recognized
the relative weakness of NLRA remedies.163 With those options re-
moved and punitive damages long since rejected,164 the chances of
meeting both the first and second requirements are faint.
Nor can the IRCA readily fill the gap. Although employers are
forbidden from knowingly employing someone unauthorized to
work (and must confirm that a new hire is so permitted) and must
verify the individual’s identity,165 the bar to prove an adequate in-
vestigation is relatively low.166 For example, employers might check
an applicant’s “other document evidencing authorization of em-
ployment in the United States” and a driver’s license to see if they
look real before finalizing the hire.167 The requirement is also met
if the applicant “attest[s]” under threat of perjury that he or she is
allowed to work.168 When these simple steps can fulfill immigration
163. E.g., Correales, supra note 10, at 141; Morris, supra note 10, at 528; Arlen Spector &
Eric S. Nguyen, Representation Without Intimidation: Securing Workers’ Right to Choose Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 311, 325 (2008); Summers, supra note 10, at
477–78; Weiler, supra note 10, at 1791.
164. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 7 (1940); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 197 (1938).
165. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(b)(1)(B)–(D) (2012). This is generally done via the I-9 form and
related procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2 (2017).
166. The requirements for an adequate investigation of immigration status permit docu-
mentation that simply appears to be genuine, allow for the attestation of status from the
potential hire under investigation, and offer a good faith defense for the employer. See 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (for verification by documents, “[a] person or entity has
complied with the requirement of this paragraph with respect to examination of a document
if the document reasonably appears on its face to be genuine”); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(b)(2)
(2012) (attestation of employee); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(b)(6) (2012) (good faith defense).
167. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(b)(1)(C)–(D) (2012). Certain documents will prove both identity
and eligibility; others must be used in combination. Documents establishing both employ-
ment authorization and identity include a United States passport or resident alien card/alien
registration card with certain security features, a picture, and personal identifying informa-
tion. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(B). Documents showing authorization to work include a social
security account number card or “other documentation evidencing authorization of employ-
ment in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(C). Identity documents include a driver’s
license or similar document issued for identification by a State with a photograph. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(b)(1)(D); see 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2 (2017) (providing further specifics on the type, na-
ture, and contents of acceptable documentation). The employer’s inspection obligation
requires it to physically examine the materials to “ensure that the documents presented ap-
pear to be genuine and to relate to the individual.” 8 C.F.R. 274a.2(b)(ii)(A).
168. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(2).
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law requirements, employers enter the employment relationship
without much risk, and know that they can subsequently invoke the
good faith affirmative defense to charges.169 In light of the Board’s
decision to calculate backpay interest on a compounded daily ba-
sis,170 the pseudo-“immunity” is worth even more to the employer.
Unless the IRCA imposes stronger obligations on the employer, it is
doubtful that it can help realign the currently reversed incentives to
follow the NLRA.171
Gonzalez’s proposals may, however, have more viability if the
General Counsel’s injunction initiative is expressly extended to or-
ganizing violations where unauthorized workers are employed. As
currently implemented, regional field offices can demand a notice-
reading by a member of management, union access to employee
bulletin boards, and employer production of a list of employee
169. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3) (“A person or entity that establishes that it has complied in
good faith with the requirements of subsection (b) with respect to the hiring, recruiting, or
referral for employment of an alien in the United States has established an affirmative de-
fense that the person or entity has not violated paragraph (1)(A) with respect to such hiring,
recruiting, or referral.”); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.4 (2017). Exacerbating the problem, an employer is
still entitled to the good faith defense even if there was a “technical or procedural failure” if
that failure occurred in the context of a good faith attempt to comply with the statute. 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6)(A); see also Correales, supra note 10, at 140 (“[I]t is important to con-
sider that the good faith defense under IRCA, and the ease with which documents that
appear to satisfy the requirements of the INS I-9 forms can be obtained, enable the em-
ployer/employee relationship to form without much of a risk to the employer.”).
170. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. 6, 7–8 (2010) enforcement denied on other grounds,
647 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
171. A step in this direction may be the expanded use of E-Verify, “an Internet-based
system that compares information from an employee’s Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Ver-
ification, to data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Social Security
Administration records to confirm employment eligibility.” What Is E-Verify?, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIG. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/what-e-verify [https://web.archive.org/web/
20171201213235/https://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/what-e-verify] (last updated July 20, 2017).
The system is currently “used nationwide by over 700,000 employers of all sizes.” Id. Making
E-Verify mandatory would slightly heighten the currently low “knowledge” standard for a
good-faith defense under the IRCA. If more employers fall within the scope of penalties, they
may be disincentivized from hiring unauthorized employees to avoid union activity and the
heightened salaries, benefits, and other protections that often come with it. In turn, unfair
labor practices involving unauthorized employees may decrease (because fewer of them are
employed) and the strategy of employers calling raids on their own facilities to retaliate
against workers may carry more risk of scrutiny. But this approach also risks encouraging
employers to filter applicants based on national origin and/or ethnicity in violation of anti-
discrimination laws. If an employer believes that it will be examined for immigration viola-
tions, it may try to dodge administrative complications by simply opting to hire fewer people
who physically appear to be of minority origin or indicate their background on employment
applications. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2012); U.S. v. Todd Corp., 900 F.2d 164, 165 (9th Cir.
1990) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-1000, at 87–88 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5840, 5842).
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names and addresses to the union, depending on the specific na-
ture of the employer’s violation.172 They may also seek additional
orders requiring the employer to grant the union access to its prop-
erty and its email/electronic communication systems.173 This
provides at least some counterweight, tilting the scale in favor of
employers’ compliance with the NLRA for the authorized employ-
ees left behind as well as their unauthorized counterparts before
the fact. Combined with the option of formal Board settlements
that allow for liquidated damages to even unauthorized employees
as the cost of avoiding avoid litigation,174 the initiative may help give
some impact to the approach Gonzalez envisions.
C. Redirecting Backpay
Another approach envisions redirected backpay rather than a pu-
nitive fine to leverage the financial disincentive provided by a
normal backpay award while avoiding a windfall for an employee
unauthorized to work in the first instance.175 Peter Shapiro suggests
taking the amount the offending employer would normally have to
pay in backpay and redirecting it to an “alternate recipient” from a
list compiled by the Board.176 In his view, “[u]sing backpay to fund
worker organizing in immigrant communities uses the money to
promote the workers’ collective voice—thereby promoting the well-
being of the entire community” while also encouraging the unau-
thorized employee to report an employer’s unfair labor practices
“even absent direct private gain.”177
While appealing to those promoting immigrant rights, this pro-
posal runs contrary to the core of the NLRA and the interests of
172. See Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon, Memorandum GC 11-01, supra note 98.
173. See Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon, Memorandum GC 10-07, supra note 98, at
1.




2017.pdf]. The Ninth Circuit has affirmed a formal settlement agreement requiring backpay
and reinstatement to employees, and placed the burden on the employer to show that any of
those employees was unauthorized and thus ineligible for those remedies. NLRB v. C & C
Roofing Supply, Inc., 569 F.3d at 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009). However, even if the employees
were unauthorized, the employer still had to adhere to the remainder of the formal settle-
ment, including liquidated damage payments to unauthorized workers as the cost of avoiding
litigation (rather than wages earned). Id.
175. Peter Shapiro, Union Shops, Not Border Stops: Updating NLRB Sanctions to Help Organize
Immigrant Workers After Hoffman, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1069 (2010).
176. Id. at 1081–82.
177. Id. at 1082.
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both authorized and unauthorized employees. Most fundamentally,
the essence of the NLRA is to protect the collective rights of em-
ployees with their common employer,178 not between members of a
common immigrant community. Moreover, any list prepared by the
Board would create an impression of self-interest and partiality
from an agency that would itself be evaluating the merits of the
allegations against the employer. There are also problems for re-
shaping incentive structures: unauthorized employees are more
likely to be paid a low wage,179 so the amount of pseudo-backpay for
the alternate recipient would also be low—and the impact on the
employer even lower. This proposal may even create an incentive
for employers to cut wages further for all employees and increase
the desirability of committing labor violations, knowing that the
lower the wages, the greater practical immunity under labor law.
Even if the backpay amount is set at some abstractly determined
“fair wage,” it would not capture the benefits garnered by the em-
ployer such as decreased costs in training, lower benefit obligations,
etc.180 Finally—but critically—like the other suggestions discussed
in this Article, it is unlikely that Shapiro’s suggestions would meet
with an enthusiastic reception in the current political climate.
Funding an organization dedicated to the unionization rights of im-
migrant workers may be seen as facilitating more unauthorized
employment—the very thing that both the NLRA and the IRCA are
trying to avoid. Even though Shapiro notes that the proposed list
would be closely vetted to ensure that organizations work for au-
thorized employees,181 much skepticism is likely to remain and it
would be difficult to prove a clear separation between the two over
time.
178. See generally Wyndham Resort Dev. Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. 765 (2011); Meyers Indus.,
Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), aff’d sub nom. Prill v NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1205 (1988).
179. It has been shown that “[u]ndocumented workers earn considerably less than work-
ing U.S. citizens. About two-thirds of undocumented workers earn less than twice the
minimum wage, compared with only one-third of all workers.” JEFFREY S. PASSEL ET AL., URBAN
INST., UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: FACTS AND FIGURES 1 (2004), http://www.urban.org/
sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/1000587-Undocumented-Immigrants-Facts-
and-Figures.PDF; see also Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497, 500 (noting low wages, long hours, and substandard conditions).
180. These are not insignificant. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t
of Labor, Employer Costs for Employee Compensation—June 2016 (Sept. 8, 2017), http://
www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm. A detailed breakdown of costs by industry, em-
ployee type, geographic location, etc. is available in the Tables appended to the Department
of Labor’s News Release. Id.
181. Shapiro, supra note 175, at 1081.
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D. Delegation of Board Authority to Immigration Authorities
Taking another tack, the perceived weakness of remedies and
ban on punitive damages under the NLRA have led Shahid Haque
and others to propose delegating the Board’s powers to the Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement department (“ICE”). In this
formulation, ICE would impose fines equivalent to backpay or,
more attractively to Haque, a fine in an amount equal to the full
benefit the employer received from the individual’s work.182
From a practical perspective, remedies under the IRCA often put
a greater emphasis on criminal penalties, higher monetary sanc-
tions, and even loss of the employer’s business license than on
addressing the actual harm caused by the violation of the law.183 As
with all governmental agencies, resources are also a concern. One
scholar noted that “[e]ven though ICE is now placing more empha-
sis on work-site enforcement, it clearly lacks the resources needed
to effectively enforce the law against employers who violate it. This
deficiency must change in the future. Employers should face stiffer
penalties for breaking illegal immigration workplace laws, and the
government should actually enforce these laws.”184 If immigration
agencies are struggling to enforce their own laws, it is unlikely that
they will step up to also enforce the NLRA.
There have been some signs of cooperation between the agen-
cies: ICE has recognized the importance of flexibility in cases of
current violations of the NLRA, authorizing the use of prosecutorial
discretion where certain mitigating factors are present.185 As Direc-
tor Morton explained, the department should consider “whether
the [unauthorized alien] is currently cooperating or has cooper-
ated with federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies, such as
ICE, the U.S. Attorneys or Department of Justice, the Department
of Labor, or National Labor Relations Board, among others.”186 A
Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of
182. Shahid Haque, Beyond Hoffman Plastic: Reforming National Labor Relations Policy to
Conform to the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1357, 1380 (2004).
These would include benefits such as the cost of protective gear and training that was not
provided to unauthorized employees, health care coverage, etc.
183. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10 (2017).
184. Gonzalez, supra note 159, at 997, 997 nn.77, 81–82 (text and citing scholarship).
185. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, to All
Field Office Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, All Chief Counsel 4 (June 17, 2011), http://
www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
186. Id.
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Homeland Security and Labor reinforces this approach and recog-
nizes that each law must work together for optimal results.187 It is
unclear how often the discretion will be used, but it points to at
least some recognition that employers might have violated the
NLRA in dealing with their unauthorized employees, and must be
disincentivized from doing so.
The normative implication of Haque’s suggestion is more diffi-
cult to overcome. His concept essentially admits that the Board
cannot—or worse, will not—adequately prevent employers from vi-
olating the NLRA when it comes to unauthorized workers and
create meaningful consequences for those whose conduct objec-
tively does so. Using ICE to collect money for violations of the
NLRA would also redirect the pseudo-backpay away from the labor
arena and towards the immigration one,188 deemphasizing the grav-
ity of the actual NLRA violation for the employer. When requiring
labor law to yield to immigration is already a large part of the cur-
rent problem, it is difficult to see how delegating the application
and weight of labor remedies to immigration will improve rather
than compound it.
E. Conditional Liability to Combat Employer Windfalls
Much has been said about windfalls to unauthorized employees
via an award of backpay and/or reinstatement, but in the intersec-
tion of the IRCA and the NLRA, there is just as much to say about
economic windfalls to employers that knowingly hire those employ-
ees. Both windfalls must be discouraged. As Robert Correales
observes, the latter kind of windfall “argue[s] strongly for treating
cases involving knowing violators of immigration law differently
187. Revised Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of Homeland
Security and Labor Concerning Enforcement Activities at Worksites 1, (Dec. 7, 2011), http:/
/www.dol.gov/asp/media/reports/DHS-DOL-MOU.pdf. To this end, the Departments
agreed that, among other types of coordination, “ICE agrees to refrain from engaging in civil
worksite enforcement activities at a worksite that is the subject of an existing DOL investiga-
tion of a labor dispute during the pendency of the DOL investigation and any related
proceeding.” Id. at 2. A labor dispute includes disputes over key aspects of the NLRA, includ-
ing “the rights to form, join, or assist a labor organization, to participate in collective
bargaining or negotiation, and to engage in protected concerted activities for mutual aid or
protection” and retaliation for exercising those rights. Id. at 1–2.
188. This approach may also doubly threaten the unauthorized employee in the case: not
only would he be denied backpay, but ICE would use that money to prosecute him and
others like him. See Shapiro, supra note 175 at 1079. This may result in an even lower rate of
reporting for employer unfair labor practices under the NLRA.
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from those involving employers who are truly unaware of their em-
ployees’ immigration status.”189 This approach is premised on the
claim that Hoffman improperly shifts the IRCA’s focus by failing to
directly address the core problem: “unscrupulous employers who
hire undocumented workers in violation of IRCA and who then dis-
charge them in violation of the NLRA when they act in concert for
mutual aid and protection, or attempt to form or join labor unions,
to play both statutes against each other and enjoy the windfall.”190
In this view, the currently misaligned incentives justify backpay for
knowing unlawful hires/violations—even more so when they would
also “help to avoid the creation of unfair competitive advantages for
violators over law-abiding businesses.”191
A “conditional foreclosure approach” with a “disqualifying condi-
tion feature” tries to reach some of these problems.192 Perhaps
because he reads the Hoffman decision as implicitly relying on the
fact that the unauthorized worker violated the IRCA by engaging in
fraudulent conduct to gain employment,193 Senn’s formulation
would tell employers that if they are sued by an undocumented
worker under federal employment law, (a) they are liable for front
and backpay remedies if the worker “obtained employment free of
fraudulent conduct because you did not comply with your IRCA
obligations” but (b) “that worker cannot recover back pay and front
pay remedies if he or she resorted to obtaining employment via
fraudulent conduct because you did comply with your IRCA
obligations.”194
Conditional liability tries to simultaneously create an incentive
and a deterrent furthering compliance with the law for workers and
unauthorized employees.195 However, a practical question remains.
What is to be done in cases where both employer and applicant
engaged in knowing fraudulent conduct (i.e., had a tacit agreement
to enter the employment relationship despite the known status of
the applicant)? Too often, both parties know precisely what they
are doing. An employer might do a cursory check of documents
and determine they “appear” to be legitimate (thereby meeting the
189. Correales, supra note 10, at 139.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 140.
192. Senn, supra note 76, at 161–63. Senn’s work addresses the federal employment law
context, however, the structure may be translated into the federal labor arena (with the ex-
ception of front pay, not available under the NLRA).
193. Id. at 159–61.
194. Id. at 162.
195. Id. at 163. A variation presented involves an amendment to the IRCA to “prevent
knowing violators from enjoying the windfall generated by their illicit conduct.” Correales,
supra note 10, at 160.
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minimum IRCA verification requirements) but know all the same
that they are hiring an unauthorized worker. This stems from the
fact that forged identity papers are rife and the difficulties in prov-
ing the requisite knowledge for an IRCA violation are many. In
these cases, “with a wink and a nod, employers like Hoffman will
accept practically any form of immigration documentation in order
to hire the low-wage laborers they need to run their businesses prof-
itably.”196 This type of reform proposal, therefore, faces the
challenge of heightened intent in cases where it is nearly impossible
to prove. As a result, employers may well continue to escape at least
some percentage of liability under the NLRA and continue to stall
progress to restore the status quo with respect to the employees
who, though not active participants, are the collateral damage of
continuing violations.
V. REMEDYING THE REMEDIES FOR AUTHORIZED WORKERS
In a post-Hoffman memorandum, the Office of the General
Counsel placed great emphasis on a formal settlement197 in cases of
employers that knowingly hired unauthorized workers and then
used that status to retaliate if they exercised their fundamental
rights under the NLRA.198 The employer’s official admission of
wrongdoing in this “meaningful remedy,” along with notice read-
ings, was thought to be particularly appropriate given the need to
reassure employees that their rights will be protected and the desire
to further a general policy of using formal settlements in cases
“where there is a likelihood of recurrence or extension of the in-
stant unfair labor practices.”199 This concern with the negative
effect of the employer’s violation on the remaining employees and
its damper on their subsequent exercise of their statutory rights
rightly suggests that the problem runs far beyond the individual un-
authorized worker and the single employer violation.
196. Cameron, supra note 12, at 33.
197. See Memorandum from Arthur Rosenfeld, Memorandum GC 02-06, supra note 84.
Formal settlements dispose of all allegations of the complaint. The procedural and substan-
tive facts of the case and unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA are set out, along with
other necessary facts to support the ultimate Board order. Critically, unless there is a provi-
sion for court enforcement, the formal settlement also includes an admission that the
respondent committed the alleged violations. A formal hearing and further proceedings are
waived. NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL PART 1, supra note 174, § 10166.3.
198. For an explanation on how a formal settlement with damages could be achieved
without violations of IRCA or the Hoffman doctrine, see NLRB v. C & C Roofing Supply, Inc.,
569 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009).
199. Memorandum from Arthur Rosenfeld, Memorandum GC 02-06, supra note 84, at 5
(citing NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL PART 1, supra note 174, § 10164.3).
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As discussed above, the current political environment and the
judicially imposed limitations on the Board’s authority, combined,
have made many of the existing proposals to solve the problems of
adequate remedial action in cases of unauthorized workers simply
unfeasible and, to many, palpably unpalatable. Moreover, they do
not fully recognize the impact of inadequately-remedied unfair la-
bor practices on authorized employees. This Article advocates a
potentially less polarizing approach that may do some good for the
authorized workers, even though it does not resolve the remedial
problems for unauthorized workers themselves. Because of the fail-
ures of the backpay and reinstatement remedies, the harms that
authorized employees experience are perhaps equally poignant and
cutting. They are severe enough to thwart the present and future
protected concerted activity of authorized employees as well as any
confidence in their statutory rights that they may have had before
the employer’s unfair labor practices. It is, therefore, even more
important to invoke the most effective remedies possible and use
them to their fullest extent, especially in favor of those whose harm
often goes unremarked upon because it is often invisible.
It is well established that the Board must tailor its remedies to the
violations in each case.200 Its remedial goal is to reaffirm to employ-
ees their Section 7 rights and to reassure them that their employer
will respect those rights in the future.201 The Board therefore has
the authority to craft appropriate remedies even when no party has
raised remedial challenges to the administrative law judge’s recom-
mended remedies.202 Indeed, in a 2015 memorandum, the General
Counsel announced his intention to explore requests for more ap-
propriate remedies in cases involving unauthorized employees to
address the “potential limitations on backpay and reinstatement
that may arise in compliance.”203
200. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 348 (1938); Ishikawa Gasket
Am., Inc., 337 N.L.R.B. 175, 176 (2001) (the Board may impose additional remedies “where
required by the particular circumstances of a case”).
201. See, e.g., Guardsmark, LLC, 344 N.L.R.B. 809, 812 (2005), enforced in relevant part, 475
F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
202. See WestPac Elec., Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1322, 1322 (1996); Care Incentives, Inc., 321
N.L.R.B. 144, 144 n.3 (1996);
203. Memorandum from Richard F. Griffin, Jr. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Office of the
General Counsel to All Reg’l Managers, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Memoran-
dum GC 15-03, 2–3 (Feb. 27, 2015), https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/
09031d4581b1d428 (considering notice reading, publication of the notice in newspapers,
training for supervisors, managers, and employees on the NLRA, bargaining orders, access to
information for the union, reimbursement of bargaining expenses, and consequential dam-
ages). The General Counsel’s memorandum also considers the value of formal settlements to
help remedy the harm to unauthorized workers. See id. It does not, however, offer details
concerning ways to target these remedies to the harmed authorized employees.
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Taking this admirable goal a step further, in recent years, the
Board has revived several remedies and expanded on others that
may be particularly appropriate to protect authorized employees in
cases involving unauthorized workers. Having identified some of
the challenges from existing remedial proposals in this area, this
section offers modest suggestions using those revived remedies. In
so doing, it limits itself to tailoring those remedies to address the
harm done to authorized employees, particularly their mental con-
fidence and willingness to exercise their rights as protected under
Section 7 of the NLRA, while leaving for another day the debates
surrounding unauthorized workers. It begins with a consideration
of the expanded notice reading, mailing and explanation of rights.
It will then discuss the publication of the board notice in local news-
papers and concludes with the possibility of visitation to ensure
continued compliance with specific Board orders. These measures,
already within the Board’s arsenal, can be invoked in unauthorized
worker cases as appropriate remedies that take some small steps to-
wards restoring the impacted authorized workers currently left with
little meaningful evidence of the sanctity of their own rights.
A. Expanded Notice Reading, Mailing, and Explanation of Rights
In Pacific Beach Hotel, the Board expanded on its usual notice
remedies by requiring an extended period of notice posting and
mailing, and expanded provisions for notice reading.204 It also cre-
ated an Explanation of Rights document that “set[ ] out the
employees’ core rights under the Act, coupled with clear general
examples that [were] specifically relevant to the unfair labor prac-
tices found in this case” to “fully inform employees, supervisors, and
managers of the employees’ rights under the Act. Such a document
will help to undo the likely impact of the violations on employees
and help remedy the chilling effect of the Respondents’ con-
duct . . . when, as here, the rights of so many employees have been
broadly suppressed for an extended period of time and in numer-
ous ways.”205 The Board ordered the employer to post the notice
and Explanation of Rights in its facility for three years (as opposed
to the standard sixty days), provide them to all new employees, mail
204. HTH Corp., 361 N.L.R.B. 709, 714, 716 (2014).
205. Id. at 715–16.
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them to the homes of all current and former employees and man-
agers for private review free from potential surveillance,206 and give
them to all management personnel to impress upon them the em-
ployer’s violations and responsibilities under the NLRA.207 It
further required the employer to retain a copy of the notice and
Explanation of Rights provided to each individual in its personnel
records along with receipts, proofs of mailing, and documentation
of distribution for three years.208
Such an extensive effort reflects the need to mitigate the chilling
“lore of the shop” and legacy of coercion concerning an employer’s
labor violations.209 When an employer commits unfair labor prac-
tices, particularly pervasive ones that live on in employees’
memories in a way that “erode[s] [their] willingness to exercise
their rights years after the actual violations,”210 that embedded fear
is as much of a harm as the lost wages after a discriminatory or
retaliatory discharge. Indeed, that fear may be even worse, because
it represents an ongoing harm passed from coworker to coworker
as part of workplace culture, even after the originally targeted em-
ployees are gone.211 With the Explanation of Rights and the
extended posting and notice requirements, the Board has recog-
nized the importance of restoring the confidence of employees who
206. Notice mailing is an established part of the Board’s remedial repertoire in cases
where posting is insufficient to dispel the effect of unfair labor practices, particularly when a
labor force is decentralized, irregular, when there has been surveillance of employee activity,
or when affected individuals may no longer be employed at the facility. See, e.g., Sambo’s
Rest., Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 777, 778 n.6 (1980), enforced, 641 F.2d. 794 (9th Cir. 1981) (enforc-
ing Board’s remedies after employer failed to file motion for reconsideration to Board); J.P.
Stevens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 878 (1966), enforced, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1005 (1967). As the Board explained in Pacific Beach Hotel, “[c]urrent and newly-
hired employees, as well as supervisors and managers, will be afforded the opportunity to
privately review the documents free from the Respondents’ potential scrutiny for as long as
necessary to understand their contents and as often as necessary to reinforce their rights in
the future. Providing employees with this information creates an immediate assurance of a
workplace culture in which their rights will be respected, and encourages an expectation of
compliance with the Act.” HTH Corp., 361 N.L.R.B. at 715.
207. HTH Corp., 361 N.L.R.B. at 714–15.
208. Id. at 715.
209. Bandag, Inc. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d 765, 772 (5th Cir. 1978).
210. HTH Corp., 361 N.L.R.B. at 714 (citing cases).
211. Id. at 713–15. As the Board explained,
When new hires learn of the employer’s prior unlawful activity, particularly in cases
involving a discriminatory discharge, they are likely to conclude that they are no less
expendable than their predecessors. . . . As in those cases, the Respondents have sent
a clear message that not only will they refuse to abide by the law, but they will take
adverse action against those employees who exercise their rights.
Id. at *26–27 (citing Intersweet, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1, 19 (1996), enforced, 125 F.3d 1064, 1070
(7th Cir. 1997)).
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are left behind and strengthening their understanding of their
rights.
An Explanation of Rights and a tailored variation of the ex-
tended mailing and posting remedies described above offer several
advantages in restoring authorized employees to the status quo ex
ante. Reinstatement of union supporters has been recognized as a
way to solidify the right of organization.212 This is due at least in
part to the educating effect of those activists, particularly in the
early stages of organizing.213 In cases involving unauthorized work-
ers ineligible for reinstatement, a workplace loses the voices of
those who are willing to exercise their statutory right to engage in
collective action. Without those voices, the lore of the shop and fear
that taking collective action will result in unlawful adverse ramifica-
tions for the remaining authorized employees—at little cost to the
employer—increases. Authorized workers see that there has been
little to no direct remedy restoring their coworkers and will likely
suspect that the same fate awaits them should they choose to act.
When, as is often the case, employees may not even know if their
coworkers are authorized or not, the risk increases. Inversely, will-
ingness to engage in collective action decreases, as does confidence
that the Board will effectively protect the rights of any employee. A
tailored Explanation of Rights mailing to the remaining employees
at the facility, along with the notice, offers a way to combat the lore
of the shop and the harm to authorized workers, particularly their
decreased mental confidence in exercising their collective rights
and reporting employer violations.214
212. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 195 (1941).
213. To that end, the Office of the General Counsel routinely seeks reinstatement in all
cases of unlawful discharge during union organizing under Section 10(j)’s injunctive power.
See Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon, Memorandum GC 11-01, supra note 98, at 5.
214. Indeed, although the Board’s policy weighs heavily in favor of reinstatement wher-
ever possible, the expanded notice mailing/posting and use of the Explanation of Rights may
be even more effective than reinstatement in some cases. Nancy Schiffer astutely identifies
the underlying problem:
The harm to the workers’ organizing campaign and their support for their union, as
well as the harm to the community and to the general enforcement needs of the Act
are repeatedly ignored. . . . [Remedies such as backpay and reinstatement] may “make
whole” the workers directly affected, but they serve no remedial purpose for workers
whose union support has been crushed and fail to serve as a deterrent for other em-
ployers contemplating similar wrong-doing.
Schiffer, supra note 153, at 8. There is also the additional problem of discharge or employee
turnover following reinstatement, frequently because the reinstated employee has exper-
ienced subsequent mistreatment. As Paul Weiler points out, “[a]n employer that is
sufficiently antiunion to break the law by firing a union supporter is also likely to feel quite
vindictive when forced to take the employee back, and may well start looking for an excuse to
get rid of him again.” Weiler, supra note 10, at 1791; see also RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG &
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Application of an expanded notice reading further recognizes
the role supervisors have in an employer’s compliance with the Act.
It also recognizes the likelihood that, as direct contact points be-
tween employees and management, supervisors likely have some
measure of culpability in the unfair labor practices. Requiring su-
pervisor and managerial attendance at public notice reading
sessions conveys a message to the observing authorized employees
that “supervisors are just as responsible as upper management for
adhering to the law . . . [and] exposes the supervisors to informa-
tion concerning their own substantive obligations under the Act.”215
B. Publication of the Board Notice in Local Newspapers
In addition to the standard posting in the employer’s facility, the
Board has, at times, ordered a respondent to publish the notice
detailing the nature of its violations in multiple publications of gen-
eral circulation in the area, such as newspapers, magazines, or
circulars.216 This remedy is well within the Board’s authority under
Section 10(c) of the NLRA;217 it is contemplated in contexts where
the violations are “flagrant and repeated.”218 In such situations, “the
publication order has the salutary effect of neutralizing the frustrat-
ing effects of persistent illegal activity by letting in a warming wind
of information and, more important, reassurance.”219 Notice publi-
cation in local newspapers can “better reach all those affected by
MOSHE Z. MARVIT, WHY LABOR ORGANIZING SHOULD BE A CIVIL RIGHT 40, 124 n.47 (2012)
(citing Thomas Geoghegan for the proposition that 80% of employees who are reinstated
will be fired again within one year); Warren H. Chaney, The Reinstatement Remedy Revisited, 32
LAB. L.J. 357, 359–61 (1981) (approximately 87% of reinstated employees stayed left their
offending employers within less than one year, and 65% of those cited unfair treatment as
the reason for their departure); Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful
Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 29–31, 29 nn.138–41 (1988) (30% of reinstated employees
in a 1962-64 study were working at their employer two years after reinstatement; 83% of
reinstated employees in a 1971-72 study left within 1 year after reinstatement and only 11%
remained after the end of 2 years).
215. HTH Corp., 361 N.L.R.B. at 716; see also Domsey Trading Corp., 310 N.L.R.B. 777,
780 (1993), enforced 16 F.3d 517 (2d Cir. 1994) (requiring manager who had committed
unfair labor practices to be present when notice is read to employees).
216. See, e.g., HTH Corp., 361 N.L.R.B. at 715; Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 470,
473 (1995), enforced in relevant part, 97 F.3d 65 (4th Cir. 1996); Three Sisters Sportswear Co.,
312 N.L.R.B. 853, 854 (1993), enforced mem., 55 F.3d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied 516 U.S.
1093 (1996); Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 73, 88 (1990); Monfort of Colorado,
Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 1429, 1479 (1987).
217. NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
218. HTH Corp., 361 N.L.R.B. at 715.
219. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d at 12 (quoting J. P. Stevens Co. v. NLRB, 417
F.2d 533, 538–40 (4th Cir. 1969)).
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the Respondents’ unfair labor practices, particularly former em-
ployees for whom the Respondents do not have current mailing
information, as well as future employees in the [industry].”220 These
concerns are also relevant in cases where affected employees do not
report to a single job site.
Although a case involving unauthorized workers may not involve
repeated violations, the employer’s conduct may well be sufficiently
flagrant when viewed in light of the resultant harm, particularly
when the conduct violates both the IRCA and the NLRA. It also
brings the employer’s violations into the open when, because of the
unauthorized status of some employees, they may otherwise remain
buried. By reaching former employees and informing others who
may be unreachable or in an impermanent residence, the publica-
tion remedy reinforces and supports the notice mailing goals
discussed above. Moreover, it helps counter the chill to the free
exercise of rights experienced by authorized employees after the
violation, thereby helping to restore the status quo ex ante to the
employer’s violation.
C. Visitation
Visitation allows an appointed Board agent to enter an em-
ployer’s facility for a defined length of time and for the limited
purpose of determining whether the employer is complying with
the Board’s remedial orders. Particularly when the remedy ordered
covers an extended period of time, requires intricate recordkeep-
ing, or has numerous components that require monitoring,
visitation helps ensure the employer’s continual compliance and
“relieve[s] employees of . . . a watchdog role . . . a factor . . . particu-
larly important in reducing the risk of retaliation against them and
in restoring their confidence in their statutory rights.”221
Although it has rejected standard or broad visitation clauses, the
Board will consider narrowly tailored visitation on a case-by-case ba-
sis “when the equities demonstrate a likelihood that a respondent
will fail to cooperate or otherwise attempt to evade compliance”
and “it appears possible that the respondent may not cooperate in
220. HTH Corp., 361 N.L.R.B. at 715; see also Local 3, IBEW (N. Telecom, Inc.), 265
N.L.R.B. 213, 219 (1982), enforced, 730 F.2d 870, 880–81 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing cases).
221. HTH Corp., 361 N.L.R.B. at 717 (ordering visitation for a period of 3 years for the
limited purpose of determining the employer’s compliance with posting, distribution, and
mailing requirements, and requiring the employer to maintain and make available for in-
spection proofs of mailing, receipts, sign-in sheets connected to its notice reading, mailing,
and related remedial obligations).
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providing relevant evidence unless given specific, sanction-backed
directions to do so.”222 Visitation is not a search for future violations
or the monitoring of general compliance; rather, when granted it is
tailored in time and scope to the specific remedies that require
ongoing monitoring.223
Use of the tailored visitation remedy in cases involving unautho-
rized workers would allow the Board to confirm that the employer
has complied with any appropriate remedies, including extended
notice mailing and publication obligations. This is especially salient
when one considers that the workers in these cases are unlikely to
report non-compliance, particularly if they are uncertain about the
relief and support the Board can offer them. Visitation therefore
supports the remedies discussed above, eases the reporting burden
on the authorized workers left behind, and reassures them that they
have not been forgotten: their rights will be protected and repeated
unlawful behavior in violation of the Board’s Order will not be
tolerated.
CONCLUSION
Incentivizing compliance with the law is perhaps one of the most
foundational goals of the legal system. Yet when two statutes, at
least four interested parties, and much emotion come together, the
task is no small challenge. The current remedial structure under
the Hoffman doctrine leaves employers tempted to violate the NLRA
and reap the financial windfalls by committing unfair labor prac-
tices and hiring unauthorized employees, a certain reversal of the
intended outcome. As explained by the Board itself, the conse-
quences are grim for creating effective law.224 But realigning those
incentives must also consider the thus far underexplored effects of
violations of the NLRA on the authorized workers in a facility who
observe the employer’s conduct towards unauthorized workers pass
with weaker-than-usual consequences. The chill on the exercise of
their protected rights, along with the erosion of the critical collec-
tive unity that the statute encourages, means that fully realizing the
purpose of the law requires additional remedies to restore their
222. Cherokee Marine Terminal, 287 NLRB 1080, 1083 n.14 (1988); see also El Mundo
Corp., 301 N.L.R.B. 351 (1991); 299 Lincoln St., Inc., 292 N.L.R.B. 172, 175 (1988); Hilton
Inn N., 279 N.L.R.B. 45 (1986), enforced, 817 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1987).
223. HTH Corp., 361 N.L.R.B. at 717.
224. See Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 376, 380 (2011) (Chairman Liebman
and Member Pearce, concurring), aff’d in part, remanded in part sub nom. Palma v. NLRB, 723
F.3d 176, 187 (2d Cir. 2013).
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mental status quo ex ante to the violation. The application of addi-
tional appropriate remedies that this Article suggests, conceived of
as restorative measures to support authorized workers, may help
move at least a step towards that goal.
